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EPISTEMIC GOVERNANCE IN THE DISCOURSE AROUND THE BLASPHEMY LAWS IN PAKISTAN

A review of columns in Dawn and *Daily Jang*

University of Tampere
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MUHAMMAD AHSAN QURESHI: Epistemic Governance in the Discourse Around the Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan**:** A review of columns in Dawn and *Daily Jang*

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After visiting Aasia Bibi, a convicted blasphemer, Governor Salman Taseer criticized the Blasphemy Laws and sought amendments in them to make them more transparent. In a matter of weeks, his own body guard, Mumtaz Qadri, killed the Governor. This chain of events led to some cautioned debate across different segments of the Pakistani society. This study looks at the discourse around the Laws after Taseer visited Aasia Bibi till the execution of Qadri. Columns from Dawn and the *Daily Jang* were analyzed in the study using the epistemic governance approach. As predicted by the theory, the study found a wide array of imageries and objects of epistemic work throughout the narratives. Differences and similarities between the findings from the two newspapers were recognized and contextualized in line with their targeted readership. Interestingly, the forms of governance and imageries were very similar between the two papers even though they catered to different segments of the society. The study also recognized the clashing and integration of different world cultures within the discourse around the Laws. Further findings include the observation of heroism and mythification of historical figures in the narratives.

Keywords: Blasphemy Laws, Epistemic Governance, World Culture

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Chapter 1: Introduction

I haven't killed or robbed anyone, but in the eyes of my country's justice system I've done something much worse: I have blasphemed. It's the crime of crimes, the supreme insult. —Aasia Bibi[1]

The Blasphemy Laws of Pakistan have attracted much controversy due to their content and implications. Derived from the "English Common Laws," they were first included in the 'Indian Penal Code' in 1860. Pakistan inherited them on its independence in 1947 and included their revised version in the 'Pakistan Penal Code'. They were first amended to declare Ahmadis, a subsect of Islam, as heretics. Later, provisions were added regarding blasphemy against *Quran* and the Prophet Muhammad. The punishment was also changed from life imprisonment to death penalty. In the almost 3 decades since the last amendment, the Laws have not changed. During this time, a total of 1335 Pakistanis have been accused of committing blasphemy (Amnesty International, 2016). While no one has been executed under the charge, at least 51 accused have been killed extra-judicially, 5 of them while in police custody (Julius 2016, Supreme Court of Pakistan 2015, p.26). The Laws have been criticized by human rights groups, civil society members and even foreign governments but to no avail. Those who favor amendments to them insist that besides being vague and against the human rights discourse, they specifically target the minorities of the country. On the other hand, their proponents insist that they are a) a spiritual and b) an integral part of the ideology of Pakistan and hence cannot be amended.

Debates on the Laws have been rare as they tend to be a sensitive and controversial topic. Their supporters, usually encompassing the religious groups, are easily offended and tend to react violently. As these groups hold significant street power, politicians have historically avoided debating on them. However, the misuse of the Laws (or indeed their use at all) has prompted many in the civil society to demand amendments to them. Citing Pakistan's commitments to numerous Human Rights conventions, they argue that the Laws undermine basic human rights and target minority religions. They also insist that trials for blasphemy cases are not transparent due to the fear around conversations on the Laws. Judges, heading these cases, are said to come under pressure due to intimidation from the religious lobby within and outside the courts. Furthermore, it is also argued that the society stigmatizes a blasphemy accused and he/she fails to lead a normal life even if they are

[1] Blasphemy: A memoir, Sentenced to death over a cup of water. Aasia Bibi's autobiography. Please see (Bibi & Tollet 2013)

acquitted by the court. Most of these must relocate along with their families and embrace new identities due to danger to their lives.

While the discourse around the Laws is usually avoided, a certain series of events brought them into the spotlight and offered much insight into the social constructs that embrace and enact these Laws. This saga pertains to a Christian woman, Aasia Bibi who was accused of blasphemy. Her case, and especially the events that followed, pushed both the proponents as well as the critics of the Laws to offer narratives in media for their stance on them. These narratives were captured for the study and analyzed in line with epistemic governance.

On 14th of June 2009, Aasia Bibi walked to a field of *falsa* berries and started picking them along with other women of her village. It was a hot day and the exhausted women, soon enough, congregated around a well to drink water. When it was Aasia's turn, she dipped the metal cup into the well, drank the water and dipped it again for a refill. It was then that one of the village woman started complaining that the 'Christian' Aasia had made the water of the well *haram* (forbidden for Muslims) (Bibi & Tollet 2013, p.20). An argument ensued in which, apparently, Aasia uttered derogatory remarks against the Prophet of Islam, Muhammad. The women, dismayed at the blasphemy, eventually contacted the village *Imam* (religious leader and the custodian of the mosque) who lodged an FIR[2] against Aasia Bibi. The police arrested Aasia and presented her in the Session court[3] which awarded her death penalty for committing blasphemy.

Salman Taseer, the Governor of Punjab[4] visited Aasia Bibi on November 20, 2010 and announced that he would plead a presidential pardon for her. In a press conference held after the meeting, Taseer criticized the Laws and sought amendments to them. His press conference attracted the furor of the religious political parties and groups who protested against the proposed amendments. In later interviews to TV channels, Taseer termed the Laws 'black laws' and declared that they were man-made and had nothing to do with Islam. This was taken by many as blasphemy and street movements were initiated to punish Taseer for it. Mumtaz Qadri, one of Salman Taseer's guards, was also offended by the comments. His anger was exacerbated after he visited mosques where the imams gave fiery sermons against Taseer and demand that he be killed. On January 4th, 2011, as Taseer came out of a

[2] First Information Report: an investigative report lodged at the police station to request criminal proceedings
[3] The first and lowest of the 3-tier Judicial system of Pakistan. The next in hierarchy is the High court followed by the Supreme court.
[4] The largest province of Pakistan. Aasia Bibi's village 'Ittan Wali' is part of Punjab.

restaurant in a posh locality of Islamabad[5], Qadri fired at him. Taseer died instantly. Qadri offered himself for arrest declaring that he had done the right thing. He was awarded a death sentence on 14 February, 2011 by an Anti-terrorist court[6]. He appealed against the judgement in High court and then later in the Supreme court. After exhausting all his appeals, Qadri sought a presidential pardon which was also declined. After a 5-year long trial, Qadri was executed on 29th February, 2016.

The saga of Aasia Bibi, Salman Taseer and Mumtaz Qadri is especially important to understand the societal discourse surrounding the Blasphemy Laws of Pakistan. None of the other 'blasphemy' cases garnered such interests from local or international press. Human Rights' groups were especially active in the case of Aasia Bibi. Pope Benedict XVI called for Aasia's release and later Pope Fracis met her family and blessed them, reiterating the plea. Salman Taseer's involvement too was a first amongst politicians. No politician before Taseer had actively gotten involved in efforts to amend the Laws to the degree that he did. Conversations on the Laws were usually hushed and avoided in public places. Taseer, on the other hand, appeared on numerous TV shows and criticized them publicly. His murder too brought a different angle to the discourse. Taseer was not killed by a terrorist organization (although many hoped for it), he was instead killed by his own bodyguard. Taseer's murder was proof how deeply indoctrinated the feelings for Blasphemy Laws are, making debates on them even more dangerous. And yet, with killing Taseer, Qadri forced the populace to question if religious outbursts could justify anarchy. His trials too were especially interesting because a sizeable proportion of the judicial system (lawyers and judges) believed that his actions were legally justified. On his first appearance in the court, Qadri was showered with rose petals by throngs of lawyers who came to support him. Similarly, an ex-chief justice of the second highest court of the country volunteered and spearheaded the his defense. All these events brought a legal angle to the discourse which was discussed by numerous lawyers and legal experts across different forms of media.

Finally, the funerals of both Taseer and Qadri displayed the discord amongst the society on the issue of blasphemy. Taseer's state funeral was turbulent as the designated Imams refused to lead the prayers of his funeral. Many politicians avoided attending his funeral and paying him his last respects. On the other hand, after Qadri was executed, the state ordered a media blackout on his funeral proceedings. Still, an estimated crowd of a

[5] Capital of Pakistan
[6] Please see chapter 3

100,000[7] attended his funeral, amongst them leaders and representatives of some of the biggest political parties of Pakistan. Since then, although Taseer has become a mere footnote in the story of Pakistan's Blasphemy Laws, Qadri has been lionized and continues to attract an overwhelming support from political leaders and common populace alike. His burial place has been made into a mausoleum with devotees travelling across the country to pay their respects to him. Pakistani media offered various interpretations of this discord, further encrusting the already dense discourse around the Blasphemy Laws.

This study sought to penetrate this discourse and analyze the different layers of societal constructs used to argue either side of the conversation. For the study, column pieces from the leading newspapers were collected throughout the time from Taseer's first visit to Aasia Bibi till the execution of Qadri. The narratives were then broken down into categories of authorities for argumentation using the grounded theory approach. Finally, imageries and objects of epistemic work were identified and contextualized in line with the different readership of the two newspapers. While at it, the different world cultures at play were also identified, questioning the country's insistence on its uniqueness and obsession towards "banal nationalism."

The study is structured in the following manner. Chapter 1 is the introduction. Chapter 2 offers the overall research idea of the study in the form of four key questions. Chapter 3 deals with the historical background of Pakistan and the country's link with its colonial past. This is followed by a historical background of the Blasphemy Laws and an overview of its applications. A descriptive narrative of the events that led to the execution of Qadri finishes the chapter. In Chapter 4, the theoretical framework of different theories applicable on the study is presented. Chapter 5 deals with the Data and Methodology of the study and describes the data collection process. Chapter 6 is a description of data structured into the categories represented in the narratives. Chapter 7 is the analysis where the findings are analyzed and further findings shared. Chapter 8 is the conclusion and Chapter 9 includes all the references.

[7] Please see: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/01/funeral-pakistani-mumtaz-qadri-executed-salmaan-taseer

Chapter 2: Research questions

The thesis is an attempt to recognize the discourse surrounding the Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan. This is done by analyzing columns published in the leading newspapers of the country, Dawn and *Daily Jang*. The former is an English newspaper and caters to the elite class of well educated, mostly liberal readership. The latter, an Urdu publication, is the polar-opposite for its readership mostly encompasses the less-educated masses of the country. The thesis is driven by the following research questions:

- What is the rhetorical and discursive work done to rationalize or oppose the Blasphemy Laws of Pakistan in their current form?
    - What are the imageries and objects of epistemic work engaged in the discourse surrounding the Blasphemy Laws? How are they used to bring the arguments forward?
    - Given the difference in readership, what are the variations between the choices of imageries and objects of epistemic work between the columns of Dawn and *Daily Jang*?
- What different world cultures effect Pakistan as it seeks to establish a stand on the Blasphemy Laws that contradict its international commitments?

Chapter 3: Historical Background

Chapter 3.1: History of Pakistan: The paradox of identity

Liaquat Ali Khan, the first prime minister of Pakistan, aptly described the country as a 'laboratory' for fusion of Islam with politics (Jalal 2014, p.56). Almost 70 years since its birth, the country continues to flirt with such experimentation, arguably growing more religious with time. Some contest that it was never meant to be a religious state. 'You may belong to any religion or caste or creed -- that has nothing to do with the business of the State'[8], the country's founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah announced in his first presidential address to the constituent assembly. There were many amongst his cabinet who disagreed with the founder's secular vision. The establishment tried to block the speech in mainstream media (Noorani 2012). Today the eloquent speech is a mere footnote in the history of the country.

[8] Muhammad Ali Jinnah"s first Presidential Address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (August 11, 1947) http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00islamlinks/txt_jinnah_assembly_1947.html

This disagreement was far from surprising. The idea of Pakistan was rooted in the identity crisis faced by the Muslims of the subcontinent during the British rule. Previously, rulers of the subcontinent and now colonial subjects, the populace continued to carry the regret of their downfall. Their insecurity worsened after the decennial census of 1872. Now quantified, Muslim leaders started "publicly" acknowledging the worrisome reality of them being a "permanent minority in a pre-dominantly Hindu India" (Ispahani 2017, p12). In 1906, a Muslim delegation under Sir Agha Khan visited British Viceroy Minto and demanded separate electorates for the Muslim population. The demands were met in the Indian Councils Act 1909. Seeing the success, the delegation formalized into 'Muslim League', a party dedicated to fight for Muslim rights in the Indian subcontinent. Thus started the identity-based political struggle that would lead to the formation of Pakistan.

Of the many important personalities in the movement for Pakistan's freedom, none matches up to Muhammad Ali Jinnah. A Britain educated lawyer, Jinnah joined the League in 1913 and eventually became its president. He had earlier resigned from India's largest native political party, the Congress, because it's president, Mahatma Gandhi, decided to support the *Khilafat* movement[9]. Jinnah was strictly against the infusion of religion and politics and his priority for the same "remained constant throughout his career" (Jalal 1994, p.8). The League, under his leadership, pressured the ruling British government for increased recognition of Muslim population in politics, eventually translating into a demand for a separate nation. Conservative Muslim leaders such as Abul Ala Maududi, the founder of the religious right party *Jamaat-e-Islami*[10], campaigned against Muslim League and disregarded the aspirations for a separate nation (Ali 2002, p.170). However, once formed, the same parties took active role in shaping the identity of Pakistan.

Jinnah passed away just a year after Pakistan's independence from British colonial rule and separation from India in August 1947. His struggle and career earned him a foundational role in the birth and existence of Pakistan. He 'championed' the movement for a separate nation and 'carved' it from the Hindu-majority subcontinent (Singh 2009, p.15). Today, he is widely recognized as the administrative and constitutional father of the nation and is the foremost representative of nationalism for the country. However, the 'true' Jinnah

[9] The Khilafat movement was a campaign in India to pressurize the British to not to abolish the Ottoman Caliphate post WW1. By supporting the mainly religious movement, Gandhi sought to win over Muslims. The movement eventually became violent when 22 policemen were killed by agitated protestors and Gandhi called off support.

[10] Jamaat-e-Islami is the biggest Islamic party of Pakistan and has been part of numerous joint-government arrangements both federally and provincially.

remains a mystery as there exist different versions of the founder with respect to different political and religious ideologies (Ahmed 1997, p.33).

Another central figure in the struggle for Pakistan is Muhammad Iqbal, commonly referred to as Allama Iqbal. An early figure in the Muslim League, he 'holds a special place as the visionary of Pakistan, (as) its spiritual founder' (Khan 2012, p. 58). In his capacity as the president of Muslim League, Iqbal gave a speech in 1930 which permanently cemented a central role for him in the movement for Pakistan. In this speech (later given the title of "Allahabad[11] address"), Iqbal stated that Muslim population of the subcontinent required a separate territory to preserve Islam. This claim earned him the title of 'the father of the Pakistan idea' (Aziz 1967, p. 54). From then on, the independence movement thrived on the idea offered by Iqbal. His support for Muslim nationalism, and hence the future Pakistan, provided 'intellectual credibility' to the independence movement (Devji 2013, p. 110). Thus, it is no understatement to call Iqbal the philosophical, cultural and ideological father of Pakistan. He died in 1938 while the Muslims were still struggling for his vision.

Jinnah's death in 1948, a year after independence, left a vacuum of leadership and gave politicians the opportunity to shape the narrative of the country from scratch, imbedding religion into it (Waterman 2014). Since the movement for its formation was based on a distinct Muslim identity, the nationalist and religious narrative easily meshed into each other, becoming an essential tool for politicians to win votes (Wynbrandt 2009). On March 7, 1949, Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, introduced the Objectives Resolution; a preamble to the planned constitution of the country (Newberg 1995). The resolution strongly supported the formation of the country's political framework on the principles and values of Islam (Bindra 1990, p.81). The nod in this direction gave the religious lobby reasons to form pressure groups to keep a check on the government's commitment to Islam. These groups grew more powerful as the state, due to sheer incompetency, failed to ensure social ethics in the country (Jalal 2014, p.57). First, in 1949, a militant Sunni organization '*Ahrar'* demanded the state to officially declare the Ahmadis as heretics (Qadir 2015). The Ahmadis, who consider themselves devout Muslims, were persecuted by other Muslims since the foundation of their sect in the late 19th century British Indian Punjab. This was largely due to the claims of their founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, of being a reformer, leader and

[11] Allahabad is a city in Utter Pradesh, India.

'prophet' of Islam[12]. In addition to theological differences, Ahmadis were often accused of colluding with British and sympathizing in the favor of the Hindu population during colonial rule. These accusations carried through after Pakistan was established and the community moved its headquarters from India to the city of Lahore in Pakistan.

In 1953, many religious parties grouped under an umbrella organization, the *Tehrik-e-Tahaffuz-e-Khatme-Nabbuwat* (Movement for the Protection of the Finality of the Prophet) and demanded the official ostracizing of Ahmadis from the Muslim community. The agitation eventually became violent translating into an organized pogrom of some 2000 Ahmadis by rioting mobs (Ispahani 2017, p.46). These movements grounded the roots for ideological interpretations of the Blasphemy Laws of the country. Formation of the 1973 constitution of Pakistan reignited the anti-Ahmadi movement in the country. The religious lobby, infuriated that Ahmadis held important positions in government infrastructure, wanted these positions for themselves. To win endorsement for the constitution from the religious lobby, then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Zulifqar Ali Bhutto[13], included the declaration of finality of prophethood in the oath of the President and Prime Minister (Taseer 1980). Moreover, there was international pressure on Pakistan for the same. King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, to counteract the increasing influence of the Shah of Iran in the region, pledged generous Saudi aid to Pakistan contingent on it accepting their *Wahhabist* version of Islam. Declaring Ahmadis as non-Muslims was also included in this demand.

Two months later, in April 1974, *the Rabita al- Alam- al- Islami* (Islamic World Congress) meeting held in Mecca demanded all Muslim governments to declare Ahmadis as non-Muslims, effectively barring them from holding official positions (Jalal 2014, p.205). In Pakistan, Maulana Abul Ala Maududi's *Jaaat-e-Islami* started a fresh wave of anti-Ahmadi riots. Maududi traditionally had close connections with the Saudis due to which the party enjoyed exuberant amounts of funding, which ensured the momentum of the movement. After a small clash between the students of a medical college and some Ahmadis in

[12] Albeit he clarified that he used the title differently. He insisted that Muhammad was the last of law-bearing prophets (the law being the God-given text of Quran). He, on the other hand, was solely a reformist prophet working on the same laws and text that Muhammad brought.

[13] Zulifqar Ali Bhutto was the prime minister of Pakistan from 1973-1977. Hugely popular, he came to power as a 'left-oriented', self-proclaimed 'socialist', leader. During his tenure, he started experimenting with Islam and tried to introduce Islamic Socialism within the society. It was under his rule that the 2nd amendment to the constitution of Pakistan was passed, which declared Ahmadis as heretics. Unlike his apparent persona, he also tried to Islamise the society for political victory over opponents. For a detailed analysis on his experimentation, please see Qadir (2015)

Rabwah[14], the sect's home town, violence spread across Punjab and NWFP (now Khyber-Pukhtunkhwa). Ahmadiyya community members were knifed, their properties and mosques burnt and graves desecrated. The riots resulted in 42 deaths, 27 of whom were Ahmadis (Kennedy 1989).

Some two months later, in June 13, 1974, Bhutto announced to discuss the Ahmadi issue in the country's parliament. From August 5 to September 7, in-camera proceedings were held. Those proceedings concluded in a unanimous recommendation for a constitutional amendment to declare Ahmadis as non-Muslims. This became the second amendment of the Constitution of Pakistan whereby the Ahmadiyya community was to be treated as a non-Muslim minority. A decade later, President Zia-ul- Haq issued the 'Anti-Islamic Activities of Qadiyani Group, Lahori group and Ahmadis (Prohibition and Punishment) Ordinance' that declared most of their social and personal activities as criminal offences (Qadir 2015). As per the additions to the penal code, most aspects of Ahmadi religious life were made illegal, leading to continued prosecution of the community (Hussain 2015). These formed a portion of the Blasphemy Laws of the country (see below).

Chapter 3.2: History of the Blasphemy Laws

Chapter 3.2.1: The British heritage. As it is with all laws, there is a historical context to the emergence, impositions and eventual amendments of the Blasphemy Laws of Pakistan. Pakistan's first constitutional instruments were the Government of India Act 1935 and the Indian Independence Act of 1947 (Hassan 2006). Its legal system of today is rooted in the laws implemented in British India, which were themselves derived from English Common Law (Lau 1994). On independence, Pakistan adopted a revised version of the Indian Penal Code and renamed it as the "Pakistan Penal Code" (Saeed 2013). A watered-down version of the Blasphemy Laws were already part of the Indian Penal Code and the new country adopted it. The history of this 'watered down' version offers insight into their evolution into their current form. The original 'blasphemy law' became part of the Indian Penal Code in 1860, three years after the Indian mutiny, which was instigated due to religious insensitivity. The British forces required the Indian army to use gun cartridges that had to be chewed before they could be used. It was later discovered that the cartridges were laced with cow and pig fat. Cows held religious significance in Hinduism whereas pigs were *haram* (forbidden) in Islam. The Indian army mutinied. The British authorities were eventually able

[14] Official name: Chenab Nagar. The only city in Pakistan with a predominant majority of the Ahmadi sect. The city is the official headquarters of the Ahmaddiya Movement in Pakistan.

to curb the mutiny and offered reforms in policies to avoid future repetitions of likely circumstances. The 'blasphemy law' was part of these reforms. Back then, the Law was introduced to ensure stability in a multi-religious society and stated that everyone had the right to practice a religion of their choice. Moreover, no one could insult religions regardless of creed or religious affiliations. The Law was not altered until 1929 when the clause of 'Offences relating to Religion' was added as 295-A. This came about after the (in)famous case of Ilm-u-din who murdered the publisher of a book that ridiculed Mohammad. When the 'blasphemous' book was published, there were protests by the Muslim community demanding the ban of the book and the persecution of the publisher who refused to reveal the name of the writer. The publisher, Rajpal, was taken to the court where he was convicted of offending religious sentiments. However, Rajpal appealed against his sentence in High court and was eventually acquitted as the judge ruled that there was no law in the state that punished such insults. Ilm-ud-din, exasperated by the failure of the judicial system, decided to take the matter in his own hands. He went to Rajpal's shop and killed him. He was arrested, found guilty of murder and hanged in 1929. After his death, the 295-A amendment was added to the law to state: *Whoever with deliberate or malicious intentions of outraging the religious feelings of any class of His Majesty's subjects, by words either spoken or written, by visible representations insults or attempts to insult religion or religious beliefs of that class shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for 2 years or fine or both.*

Ilm-u-din is still revered today as a hero in Pakistan. As will be seen later in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, the incident of Ilm-ud-din is used to justify the actions of Qadri claiming that in his case as well, the state was incompetent to impart justice.

Chapter 3.2.2: Evolution of the Laws. When adopting the 'blasphemy law' as part of the Pakistan Penal Code, the state increased the sentence for blasphemy to 10 years. As detailed above, the Ahmadiyya sect were declared non-Muslim in 1974 during the government of Zulifqar Ali Bhutto. In 1982, during the tenure of the Islamist military dictator, Zia-ul-Haq, the Blasphemy Laws were further amended to become far more reaching and strict, a form that still exists in the society today. Zia had overthrown Prime Minister Bhutto in a military coup in 1977; Bhutto was later tried by a military court and hanged. In order to rationalize his unconstitutional rule, Zia sought the favor of the Islamist parties by introducing Sharia Law in the form of *Hadood* (limits) ordinance. These ordinances made alterations in the Pakistan Penal Code and introduced Islamic Punishments.

It was during Zia's tenure that a *Majlis-e-Shura* (an Islamic parliament) and a Federal Shariat Court were constructed comprising unelected, handpicked orthodox individuals, who were given the power to make amendments to the constitution and laws. Moreover, the Evidence Act of 1872 was replaced by "*Qanune Shahadat* (the law of claiming) Presidential Order XX of 1984" whereby the provisions were to be read and judged in light of the Quran and Sunnah and the credibility of the witnesses was based on observing Islamic injunctions (Shakir 2015). With this infrastructure set, a number of amendments were made to the Blasphemy Laws. In 1982, a new law was passed that included punishment for desecrating of the Quran. Act III of 1986 was also included after much religious lobbying which extended the section to also include insult to the Prophet Muhammad. These acts came under article 295-B of the constitution which increased the 10-year punishment to life imprisonment. A later article, 295-C was added to make the punishment as life imprisonment or death. Later, in 1991, a petition was brought to the Federal Shariat Court where the possibility of life imprisonment was challenged. The court ruled that the possibility of any other punishment besides death was 'repugnant'[15] and hence the sole punishment of capital punishment was set in law for all blasphemy convicts. Nearly 3 decades later, the same Laws and punishments prevail in the country. No government in the subsequent tenures was able to put the draconian laws to debate due to intimidation by the religious lobby and the sensitivity of the issue.

Chapter 3.2.3: An overview of the Laws and their misuse. There is no denying the fact that the Blasphemy Laws have "had disastrous effects on the entire Pakistani society" (Shakir 2015). The Laws are widely acknowledged to be misused for ulterior motives. In addition, they sharply contradict "human rights guaranteed by the constitution of Pakistan and international treaties" (Julius 2016). The amendments, which are insisted by their proponents to protect the minorities and to stop misuse, have in fact made the society more intolerant. Also, the accusations are not limited to minorities or socially deprived individuals. In fact, individuals bearing a liberal mindset (such as Junaid Hafeez, a Fulbright scholar languishing in jail since 2013 for voicing liberal thoughts), slanting towards a Sufi interpretation of Islam (Shemeem Burney Abbas and Amjad Sabri), or for being an Ahmadi and practicing one's religion, are all accused under the Blasphemy Laws. During British Rule till independence in 1947, there were a total of 7 cases filed on the original version of the laws (Shakir 2015). Post-partition and before the amendments in the 80s, 8 cases of

[15] The Court order found in Sr. No 336 in:
http://federalshariatcourt.gov.pk/Leading%20Judgements/decided%20shariat%20cases.doc

blasphemy were reported. Since the amendments in 1987 to 2016, 1335 cases have been reported (Amnesty International, 2016). 51 accused have been killed extra judicially, some of them after being acquitted by the courts, some while still in police custody (Julius 2016, Supreme Court of Pakistan 2015, p.26). The mob justice has not been limited to the accused alone, for throngs of emotional Muslims have often used claims of blasphemy to burn down entire Christian villages. Such is the insistence of death sentence for blasphemy accused that Maulana Yousaf Qureshi, the cleric of *Mohabat Khan* Mosque in Peshawar, on a potential presidential pardon for Aasia Bibi declared: "We expect her to be hanged and if she is not hanged then we will ask the Taliban to kill her." More recently, just before the final appeal of Aasia Bibi in the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the clerics of an infamous Islamabad mosque, who are known to have ties with Al-Qaeda and Taliban, warned the courts against any leniency towards Aasia Bibi. The reliance of and connections to international terrorist organization for "blasphemy" cases reveals the larger problem with religiously motivated laws in general. These laws hence don't solely reflect a local narrow-mindedness but, in fact, have also become part of the international security and global terrorism narrative as tools for militant ideology (Abbas, S.B. 2013).

Chapter 3.2.4: The case of Aasia Bibi. In 2010, for the first time since the inclusion of the Laws, there was political activity towards reforming them. Salman Taseer, the governor of the biggest province of the country, Punjab, lobbied for a revision of the Laws after meeting Aasia Bibi, the first woman to be sentenced to death for committing blasphemy in the history of Pakistan. Taseer also announced that he would seek presidential pardon for the accused as her punishment was very 'strict' and 'cruel'.[16] He also insisted that the Blasphemy Laws were being used to target and harass minorities. His call was supported by the Federal Minister for Minorities, Shahbaz Bhatti. However, there was widespread reaction to the press conference. Religious parties took to the streets to protest his claims. By criticizing the Laws and claiming them to be man-made, these parties claimed, Taseer had committed blasphemy as well. Certain leaders appealed to the Chief Justice of Pakistan, to take *suo moto* (self-initiated) action against Governor Taseer for supporting Aasia Bibi. There was an obvious discontent between his own party. The country's Law Minister, who

[16] Direct translation from the press conference. Original words were *"Sakht"* and *"Zaalim"*.

belonged to the same political party as Taseer, the Pakistan People's Party[17], exclaimed that "in my presence as the Law Minister, no one should think of finishing this law(s)."[18]

In a matter of weeks, on January 4, 2011, Salman Taseer was assassinated by his own guard as he came out of a restaurant in a posh locality of Islamabad. 2 months later, on March 2, 2011, Shabaz Bhatti was killed by Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan for his support for the amendments of the Blasphemy Law. The murderer of the Governor, Mumtaz Qadri, insisted that his actions were in line with Quran. His first trial was held in an "Anti-terrorism court" (ATC) where he was sentenced to death. These courts were especially developed by the country's polity to give swift decisions on cases pertaining to terrorism. The decisions passed could be appealed against in the high courts of the country. Qadri's council did just that in October 2011. On 9th March 2015, the Islamabad High court maintained the death sentence on Qadri while accepting his application that his actions did not fall under the purview of terrorism. Qadri's council, encouraged at this development, appealed against the High court's decision to the highest court of the country, the Supreme Court. The appeal was lodged on April 2015 and the appellants sought the annulment of his death penalty. In its landmark decision in October 2015, the Supreme Court bench not only maintained Qadri's death penalty but also, disagreeing with the Islamabad High court's decision, re-included the terrorism charge on him. His council filed for a review petition which was dismissed by the court in December 2015. After the courts maintained his death penalty, Qadri's council sought a presidential pardon which was declined as well. Throughout his trial, besides support from religious and political parties, Qadri was supported by a significant portion of the legal community. On his first appearance in court, he was greeted by a hundreds of lawyers who pledged their support for him and showered roses on him[19]. A former chief justice of a high court voluntarily defended his case. In Qadri's court appearances, his legal team outnumbered the police presence in the courts.[20] After a long and dangerous judicial process lasting over five years, Mumtaz Qadri was hanged on 29th February 2016.

As of the latest, Aasia Bibi's last appeal against the death sentence in the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which was scheduled for 13 October 2016, has been adjourned till an

[17] Pakistan People's Party was founded by Zulifqar Ali Bhutto, the originator of the 2nd amendment (please see above). However, as described, he was a leftist leader and his party followed the stance after his death. Today the party continues to follow the same ideology and comparatively more progressive than its counterparts.

[18] Interview: https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/610178-babar-awan-says-no-one-can-change-blasphemy-law

[19] Lawyers shower roses for governor's killer: https://www.dawn.com/news/596300

[20] Mumtaz Qadri's legal team outnumbers police presence at IHC: https://www.dawn.com/news/1159926

unforeseen date. These events form the spine of this thesis. A representation and analysis across these different events will follow in chapter 6 and 7.

Chapter 4: Theoretical Framework

Chapter 4.1: World Culture

The world of today is unique in its form. It's compressed and interdependent (Robertson 2008, 49) and isomorphic (Thomas 2009). The term global village has become more than a cliché: it's become an explanation of the life being lived today by actors spread all across the world. Even in the remotest of regions, the influence of globalization can be observed and felt. The supra-territorial relations (Scholte 2005), economic dependence (Pieterse 2013) and social interactions (Held and Mcgrew 2000, pg.3) further the process of globalization. In this interconnected environment, global policies are pursued and adopted out of sheer fashion (Alasuutari, P. et al, 2014).

Many theories try to explain this homogenization. Historically linked to John W. Meyer (Schofer et al. 2012, 57), neo-institutionalism explains these similarities in terms of "world culture" accepted inherently by a world society. Described by Thomas (2009), "world culture" explores the idea of global cultural forces dictating trends that transcend borders and appeal to the world society. Boli and Thomas (1997) rightly recognize world culture as a lens through which we can understand the world we live in. The norms and trends adopted by all actors come about due to the environment allowed by the cultural setting of the world. The naturalization of trends is a result of shared beliefs and perceptions prevalent across the world (Meyer et al. 1997), making them the "obvious" choice. These trends are adopted rationally by actors due to self-engineered decision makings. Nations all over the world indulge in such "rationalism," adopting a world cultural script inherently (Meyer & Bromley 2013). In this setting hence, each player individually rationalizes to come to the same decision as others. The countries firmly believe that the chosen decisions best serve their interests. Hence they do not need any coercion, manipulation or dictation for it.

The signing of human rights conventions by numerous countries worldwide is one such example of world culture. Countries have come to believe that the conventions are gateways via which they can show themselves as what Meyer et al. (1997) calls "proper" states. Being "proper," as a preference, is inherently built on seeing "privileges" that come with being developed. So, the countries base their decision on this imagery of the world and sign onto conventions, even those that they hardly believe in or plan to pursue. The belief is a

representation of world culture. Signing onto these conventions are a world cultural norm exercised by most of the countries across the world even though there is no political or regional pressure on them to do so. Taking example from the thesis, on being founded, Pakistan was not forced by any country to first make the Pakistan Penal Code and then later dedicate its bureaucratic and political machinery to form a constitution. And yet, it was the first thing it did. This was due to its belief that having a constitution was the requirement of being recognized as a state. In reality, no such guidelines to nation-building exist. Pakistan was simply adhering to a world-cultural norm by becoming exactly like any other country on the globe.

Chapter 4.1.1: Cultural scripts. Trends that diffuse across nations and become inherent choices are examples of actors enacting global models and cultural scripts (Alasuutari 2014). These scripts are in line with the layers of world culture the states are embedded into. Nation states firmly take themselves as representation of being sovereign and autonomous actors. However, the actions they undertake at global or local level tend to reflect the expectations of global cultural scripts they adhere to (Meyer et al, 1997). Hence the cultural scripts can be seen as the contexts that guide the nations to reach their decisions. The cultural scripts do not solely exist at nation state level. In fact, every actor is deeply ingrained in this practice of embracing and acting on world-culture scripts. For example, students in universities all over the world, single mindedly pursue their degrees for better professional opportunities. In this pursuit, many students spend much time and energy mastering skills that have no use in their professional lives but they are 'expected' to know. Although hardly anyone reaches a point in their lives where these expectations materialize and the said skill is made use of, but the students continue to enact and believe these supposed expectations generations after generations.

Chapter 4.2: Epistemic governance

The world today is isomorphic to a greater degree than it was ever before (Thomas, 2009). Isomorphism is defined as: "a world whose societies, organized as nation states, are structurally similar in many unexpected dimensions and change in unexpectedly similar ways" (Meyer et al., 1997). In this environment, national polices debated and applied on a local level seem to be incredibly similar to international trends. Interestingly, political actors are seen to embrace these trends wholeheartedly by justifying them as the rational choice (Dobbin et al., 2007) and as something that's good for them (Alasuutari, 2011). Once

convinced, these actors pitch a narrative that derives out of the widely accepted social reality. Alasuutari and Qadir (2014) see this as an example of epistemic governance.

The Cambridge dictionary describes the term "epistemic" as an adjective related to knowledge or studying of knowledge. In that sense, epistemic governance would imply governing based on imposing or presenting of knowledge. In their paper, Alasuutari and Qadir (2014) build upon this definition in terms of the technique policy makers use to convince their audience and push forward policy changes. The policy makers rely on the conceptions of the audience about the society, which they are part of, to govern them epistemically. It is important to note here that the policy makers do not indulge in a "conspiracy" and manipulate the audience after recognizing their "weaknesses." On the contrary, epistemic governance is a natural, mostly un-motivated technique of forming narratives. Consciously or otherwise, all of us indulge in epistemic governance when trying to convince someone else of something. These widely recognized understandings which form the background for epistemic work are based on (self-evident) mental imageries of the society (Alasuutari & Qadir, 2016). The imageries include: perceiving a modus operandi to social evolution/ modernization/ development, seeing the society as hierarchically organized, and distributed into competing blocs. Hence, the actor must work along the well-established imageries to make their audience believe in them. In the first case, they can insist on a particular policy being essential for development. Similarly, they can emphasize the natural belief of a hierarchical society and use the layers to validate their points. Lastly, they can rely on the belief of competitiveness, terming their view important for an eventual victory. This epistemic work can be both conscious and unconscious. However, not all imageries need to necessarily exist in all the discourses. Actors can also employ just one or two imageries.

The imageries form the basis for arguments and narratives. The perceived reality is only as real as the imageries the actors believe in. The imageries contextualize steps and actions and form the basis of thought process related to opinionating about matters. In that sense, the actors conceptualize how the situation looks like to their audience and develop ways to act on these conceptions. As an example, an analysis of the actions of a lone terrorist through epistemic governance can highlight the merits of this approach. Most of the lone terrorist tragedies are subject to beliefs that are often brushed aside by labeling the terrorist "delusional" or "indoctrinated." The terrorist of course does not box himself in these categories. Deep down, he firmly believes in these imageries so much so that he is ready to give away his life or to harm others for them. The imageries contextualize his version of

reality and helps him understand how to look at situations. The imageries also help him gauge the options available to him to act or respond. In this case the terrorist might, for example, see his environment clashing with his traditional values. He could also recognize that the society is hierarchical and he is very low in that order to make any change. Moreover, the society that is modernizing around him is puncturing his traditional values and dogmas. All these imageries might frustrate him. His actions now will be based on the contextualizing of these imageries that he believes in. The example will be continued after explaining the of epistemic work.

The actors engaging the imageries of their audience focus on three objects of epistemic work: the ontology of the environment, the understanding of the actors and identifications, and generally accepted values and norms. These objects are essential in forming one's view of the reality. The ontology of the environment refers to presenting the situation at hand using authoritative knowledge. By using facts and research, an actor shows that he better recognizes what the "reality" is. The said presentation can be real or exaggerated and can influence another's perception of reality hence making them more agreeable.

Similarly, the actor can further generate a consensus on a decision or action by associating it to the true or forced identification of the audience. Thus, epistemic work can involve emphasizing identifications; creating a community with shared interests. These identifications can be based on what people understand of themselves, on who they think they are and what community they think they belong to.

Lastly, the actor must convince others that a particular action is in accordance with shared norms, ideals and mores. These norms are an essential part of any society and are deeply ingrained in the mindset of the individuals. In some ways, he too defines the individual's perceptions, beliefs, principles and preferences. By linking an action to widely shared values, the actor manages to undertake an incredibly effective approach towards establishing epistemic dominance.

Yet again, the understanding of the role, the norms and the ontological reliance is taken for granted. Actors manage to believe in imageries depending on how they identify themselves. These identifications are themselves based on the ontological stock the actor has. Once the actor manages to identify himself in line with perceived imageries, the way forward is a result of a cultural script embedded into the actor's psyche. He is supposed to act in a

particular way; think in a particular manner. Of course, these norms and values are not forced upon the actor but are sought by themselves as the 'normal' and natural next step.

Going back to our example of the lone terrorist who believes in certain imageries, he now must act on them. Before he acts, he will understand the situation based on facts. He will appeal to information banks that can further cement his understanding of the imageries. In this case, instead of looking at databanks that are conventionally accepted, he would instead rely on data made available through terrorist propaganda to confirm his understanding. Similarly, he would dig deeper into these outlets to understand the ontology of the environment. Based on this understanding, he would then associate himself to a particular identification. Of course, this association will come naturally and automatically to him. the terrorist might find himself as an agent of change; the one who will turn the tables and correct what is wrong. As this agent of change has gauged the situation based on the imageries and the ontology, he will now proceed with the "norm" by acting as dictated by the fabric of his perceived realities. In such cases, the norm is usually the challenging of the prevalent system; harming it. Ergo, the terrorist will move forward and terrorize the system in an attempt to shape it in accordance with his version of the reality.

Alasuutari and Qadir (2014) insist that for epistemic governance to take place effectively, an actor must work on all 3 of the above-stated epistemic objects. The thesis will look into this claim by identifying a) the self-assumed imageries and b) the 3 epistemic objects in the narratives of the columns of the chosen papers.

Chapter 4.3: Columns as reflection of society

Media does not merely affect the society; it reflects it as well (Nawaz, 1983). In that sense, the content that is published, besides representing accepted views of the state, reflects the discourse within society. The editorial frames are true hallmarks of views and opinions of the target audience (Fair & Hamza, 2016). They imitate public discourse by highlighting prevalent opinions, values, ideologies and power structures (Shoeb, 2008). The editorial and columns sections of newspapers offer much insight into the prevalent societal opinions and editorial biases (Haque & Sheikh, 1994). While there have been extensive studies on framing by newspapers, most have largely focused only on the reporting manner and news stories (Eilders & Lüter, 2000). Although framing is similar to epistemic governance, it does not fully capture the essence of the approach. The adherents of the framing approach perceive that there is an active agency that seeks to choose frames for its audience. Hence, the audience are seen as passive partners of this arrangement. However, in epistemic governance,

the frames are not seen as "manipulated" but are natural lenses that are ingrained in the realities the active audience and the selecting columnists and editors believe in.

Strategically placed across the editorial section, columns aim to attract new users while simultaneously improving the quality of debate in the society and informing its readers (Rosenfeld, 2000). The columns can be rightly seen as advocacy tools, as they are mostly written by the "elites" of their fields (Sommer & Maycroft, 2008). In that manner, the columns can also represent how these "elites" view the society. Connecting this to our understanding of epistemic governance, the columns are indeed the best representation of the 'realities' the elite believe their readership adheres to. As the columns are published in national newspapers, they also have the potential to influence the agenda of other media outlets (Golan, 2006). The columns also give the newspapers opportunity to focus on long term issues instead of the daily grind (Haque & Sheikh, 1994). Yet again, they offer insight into how the columnist believe their readers engage in discourses. By not pursuing the daily grind alone, the columnists manage to highlight the issues that are either ignored or replaced by other engaging news items. In that sense, the columns can be seen as highlighting the discourse that the society is focused on rather than the influx of events and news presented in the headlines.

Chapter 5: Data and Methodology

Chapter 5.1: Critical Discourse Analysis

The data has been analyzed via a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Van Dijk (1977), one of the pioneers of CDA, describes discourse as seeing a text in its context. Fairclough (1992) terms discourse as the practice via which world is constructed in its meaning. Hence, facts and statistics are given a degree of depth by associating conceived notions with them. In that sense, a discourse is directed to go beyond the words and look at how language influences reality. Discourse, in its form and content, provides the fabric on which a fact makes sense to a targeted audience.

A discourse analysis would seek to explore the meaning, structure and function of the discourse (Smith, 1999). Taking a look at discourse critically, CDA manages to reveal the discursive sources of power while also pointing out how these sources are "maintained and transformed within the contexts of the society" (Van Dijk, 1988). Several power authorities and agencies makeup our social structure. CDA helps the analyst to interpret and reflect the social threads within the narrative in this structure (Luke, 1997), while also addressing social

problems (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997). In that sense, CDA looks upon the many factors at play that seek to employ some form of dominance to either shape or be in line with the narrative of the audience (Jaynes, 2015). CDA manages to bring forth the meanings, both apparent and latent within the context. These can be explicitly mentioned in the text or can be in the form of implied meanings that would make sense to a specific audience or readership.

The data for this study underwent a discourse analysis keeping the social and religious realities of the potential audience in context. As the analysis was to be based on the social discourse on the Blasphemy Laws of the country, much attention was paid on the language used by the columnists. However, the content of the opinion pieces was left independent to shape its own arguments, without any preconceived expectations from them. This independence subsequently helped the author to come up with categories and subcategories for coding of the data, in line with the grounded theory approach. Charmaz (2008) explains how employing grounded theory in coding practices helps in coming up with analytical categories which can then be refined to offer abstract, conceptual theories of studied empirical phenomenon. For the study, categories of authorities were discovered after a sample of the data was analyzed using the grounded theory. The apparent trends formed the following categories of authority: a) Religion/Religious Authorities, b) Historical accounts, c) Law and Legal, and d) International lens. The breakdown and the analysis for these categories can be found in more detail in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.

Chapter 5.2: Media in Pakistan

Print media plays an especially significant role in energy-deprived countries such as Pakistan and is considered more 'credible and reliable' (Iqbal, A. et al, 2013). Fair et al (2015) downplays the potential of internet access as a source of information for Pakistanis due to the shortage of electricity to charge or power equipment. Established in a more viable position to reach the masses, the print media in Pakistan besides being a mobilizing force for change, is also a source of information for other media outlets (Nadadur, 2007). As of 2003, there are 945 print-media publications (newspapers and magazines) in Pakistan's media space, publishing in 11 languages (IMS, 2009). Of these publications, a substantial proportion publishes in Urdu and English. Although spoken by a minority, both are the official languages of the country[25]. Urdu, which is the national language, inherits many of its words from local and regional languages and is widely understood even if not as widely spoken. As

[25] CIA Factbook available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html

part of the colonial baggage, Pakistan inherited English as an official language and continues to use it as such.

The divide between the audience of the two languages is not a mere technicality but instead represents the larger ideological differences that divide the Pakistani society (Shoeb, 2008). Urdu newspapers which constitute 75% of the sold newspapers[26], are mainly 'conservative, folkloristic, religious and sensational' (IMS, 2009; Bukhari, 2015). In contrast, English newspapers, by and large, are more liberal and professional (Qadir & Alasuutari, 2013).

The state of Pakistan, making use of a newspaper's ability to present news items and filter information available to the masses, keeps a strong check on the content in the form of both direct and indirect measures. The civilian government, for example, exerts pressure indirectly via either dedicating or restraining extensive budgets for advertisements (Nadadur, 2007). They also pressurize the newspaper media houses by altering economic sanctions such as restricting newspaper pulp quotas or duties (Akhtar, 2000). The military intelligence too keeps a keen eye at the content, especially on the Urdu newspapers as they are the most widely understood and distributed (Fair & Hamza, 2016). Ergo, the newspapers represent the opinions and views of powerbrokers of the country showcasing the reality they perceive the audience of the newspapers believes in.

The column pages are equally interesting pieces of analysis in Pakistani newspapers. Fair et al (2015), describing the general trend in a society, pointing out that people tend to take intellectual shortcuts by relying on the opinions of "respected elites" and establishing their own positions on them. This is more common in low information societies such as Pakistan, where these "elites" can be anyone from a radio or television commentator, a columnist or simply anyone held in high esteem. Some of the media elites who contribute as columnists for the leading newspapers of the country are either hosts or frequent guests on leading talk shows (Fair & Hamza, 2016). Hence, they manage to indulge in what Lecheler et al (2015) call 'repetitive framing', predisposing their audiences to certain ideologies and realities.

This research focuses on columns published in Dawn and *Daily Jang* newspapers of Pakistan. Dawn, an English newspaper, was launched in 1941 by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan (Long, 2009). The paper tends to pursue left of center policies (Fair & Hamza, 2016). As the IMS (2009) reports, English newspapers tend to have smaller

[26] INFOASAID: Pakistan Media and Telecoms Landscape Guide June 2012

audiences as compared to their Urdu counterparts, however, they have greater leverage on opinion makers and the general upper strata of the society. Hence, it has an elitist leadership and is not read by the common people (Akhtar 2000, pg.xxviii). However, as it is the most circulated English newspaper with a circulation of 138,000 daily and 10 million online views per month[27], it can be seen as a reflection of the views and opinions of the elite.

As per INFOASAID Pakistan, three of every four newspapers bought in 2008 in Pakistan were published in Urdu[28]. The daily *Daily Jang* is the most widely circulated and read newspaper in Urdu, with a daily circulation of over 800,000 per day and readership estimates of over 7 million (Jawad, 2008). The newspaper has a moderate conservative leaning (IMS, 2009). Some of its leading columnists host talk shows or appear as analysts on GEO news, one of the most popular TV channel of Pakistan and a sister organization of the *Daily Jang* Group. Due to its wide circulation and readership, the *Daily Jang* can be seen to represent the views and opinions of majority of the population.

Chapter 5.3: Data collection

The study is based on opinion pieces published in Dawn and *Daily Jang*. The choice for each were natural given their readership. The columns were collected from the archive sections of the websites of the respective newspapers. While there were numerous opinion pieces published in the newspapers that dealt with the themes of religion, extremism, minority rights etc., an effort was made to streamline the collection so that it best represented the discourse around the Blasphemy Laws of Pakistan. Generic pieces on the spread of extremism were not included in the data as the spread of extremism during the timeline could not be solely correlated to the Laws. However, generic articles about minority rights were included in the data as the Laws directly affect minority rights.

The following timeline was created for the Aasia-Taseer-Qadri saga detailed in Chapter 3:

- Nov 20, 2010: Taseer visits Aasia Bibi and calls the Blasphemy Law as a 'black law'
- Nov 23, 2010: Ahle-e-Sunat issues a Fatwa and declares Taseer as an apostate
- Jan 4, 2011: Taseer is assassinated
- Feb 14, 2011: ATC[29] charges Qadri

[27] INFOASAID: Pakistan Media and Telecoms Landscape Guide June 2012
[28] *ibid*
[29] Anti-terrorism court. Please see Chapter 3

- Oct, 2011: Qadri is sentenced to death
- Oct, 2011: Qadri appeals against the sentence
- March 9, 2015: IHC[30] upholds death sentence
- April 13, 2015: Qadri appeals to SC
- Oct 7, 2015: SC maintains death penalty
- Dec 14, 2015: SC dismisses review petition
- Feb 22, 2016: Qadri appeal's for the presidential pardon
- Feb 29, 2016: Qadri is hanged

The initial plan was to do a word search on the archive section and download the columns that fit the query. However, neither newspaper had such option on their website. Ergo, a manual search was done based on the above timeline. All opinion pieces archived on the newspaper's websites till 15 days after an event on the aforementioned timeline were read and those pertaining to the concerned events were downloaded. The rationale for 15 days was the fact that columns do not necessarily appear on the next day of an event. Hence, a 15-day margin was given to columnists for every event, giving them reasonable time for writing and publishing their opinions. While all the desired columns were available in the Dawn archive, there was a gap in March- April 2015 columns in the *Daily Jang* archive hence the columns for these two months were not included in the data set. The final quantum of column filtered and shortlisted from both the newspapers amounted to 143 columns; 60 from Dawn and 83 from *Daily Jang*. However, some of the columns were exempted as they did not directly engage with the Blasphemy Laws. The final total count amounted to 128. For a further breakdown, according to timelines, please see Chapter 6.

Observations in the text shaped the coding categories. There were no predefined categories. Rather, a close reading of 10% of the data (8 Urdu columns and 6 English columns) was done to identify patterns of discourse. Special emphasis was on the narratives that illustrated the working of epistemic governance in the column. These were then translated into questions, which formed the basis of the data sorting. Data was then sorted into codes that reflected these questions. Once these codes were deemed satisfactory, all the data was distributed into them in Microsoft Excel. In case some important data did not fit in the category, they were recorded separately for future reflection. The codes/categories were not, as has been showed, theory-driven. In fact, they were finalized in line with what the data reflected, as is the case generally with the grounded theory.

[30] Islamabad High Court. Please see Chapter 3

The data was sorted and divided into four primary categories of authorities within which all the discourse could be captured[31]. These categories were: Religion/Religious authorities, Historical accounts, Law and Legal and International lens. 'Religion/Religious authorities' included all the passages that spoke about religion in general or religious authorities in specific. Similarly, 'Historical accounts' included narratives that spoke about history, be it religious, national or international. The 'Law and Legal' code included all the accounts where the columnist used legality as an authority to their arguments. This reference could be to judicial processes, rulings and decisions or to the constitution of Pakistan. Lastly, the 'International lens' included narratives where the columnists either quoted international expectation, trends, conflicts or comparisons. Chapter 6 will describe how the data can be looked at through these categories.

The Urdu data was translated into English by the author and to avoid any loss in translation, the Urdu to English dictionary '*Kitabistan's* New Millennium Composite Dictionary: New Millennium edition' was used where required. The data was controlled for and checked against the following: the language (and hence representing different demographics of readers) and events within the aforementioned Aasia-Taseer-Qadri timeline. The process of scrutiny, filter and coding adopted by the author falls in line with discourse analysis used by Alasuutari (2004) and Fairclough et al. (2013).

Besides the sorted data, the author also kept a 'field diary', where observations were noted down while going through the data. The notes also included personal opinions of the author, interesting findings and ideas for analysis. These notes were eventually incorporated within the analysis and formed basis for some arguments.

The data quoted hereunder in results is coded according to the following format: (Language[E/U]) (Date[DDMMYYYY]) _ (Number of column published on the same day) (Timeline[a/b/c])

A more detailed index is collected in the appendix and contains the following information on all quoted columns: Author, Name of Newspaper, Date, Complete title.

[31] Other categories or overlapping categories could also have been developed. However, for the arguments discussed in this thesis, all data fits into the chosen categories.

Chapter 5.4: Ethical considerations

Ethical standards were maintained while collecting the data. All of the columns were retrieved from public archives on the newspaper's websites and can be accessed and checked for, if required. Since the data is all in the public domain, no special ethical considerations were necessary.

Chapter 6: Description of data

Chapter 6.1: Proportion

A total of 128 articles were broken down into codes after further filtering them.

The data was analyzed with the following controls: Language and Timelines. The two languages in the data were English and Urdu. The timeline of events was divided into 3 portions:

1. Event A included articles from November 20, 2010 (the day Salman Taseer met Asia Bibi) to January 4th, 2011 (the day he was assassinated)
2. Event B included all the court proceedings of Mumtaz Qadri from the session court ruling on February 14, 2011 to the dismissal of his presidential pardon on Feb 22, 2016, after both the high court and the supreme court maintained the original ruling
3. Event C included writeups published after the execution of Mumtaz Qadri.

Language	Timeline A	Timeline B	Timeline C
English	7 (16%)	34 (67%)	10 (20%)
Urdu	12 (16%)	55 (71%)	10 (13%)

Chapter 6.2: Differences in the use of adjectives between the two languages

The choice of words used to describe 1) Asia Bibi, 2) the Blasphemy Laws, and 3) Mumtaz Qadri offers insight into two things: a) what the authors themselves believe about the Laws and b) their freedom to voice opinions in view of the paper's readership. As Mumtaz Qadri only becomes part of the narrative onwards of Timeline B, the differences in adjectives for him are discussed later.

There was a stark difference between the descriptions in the two newspapers. As indicated above, Dawn pursues left of center policies and its readership mostly includes the elites of the society. A wide array of adjectives were used to describe the case of Aasia Bibi. A majority of the columnists were greatly sympathetic towards Aasia Bibi. The very first column published on 20th of November 2011 called her 'hapless' while terming her

predicament 'disgusting'. This article was published on the day Salman Taseer met Asia Bibi for the first time and hence is not a projection of the meeting and press conference that took place after it was published. However, it does offer the viewpoint of time preceding Salman Taseer's involvement. Given the columnist was able to call a blasphemy accused "hapless," and the accusation on her as "disgusting," it highlights the freedom he had (with respect to his readership) to voice his opinion on the controversial Law.

Moving forward in the timeline, the adjectives maintain the same tone, staying strongly critical. While discussing the Blasphemy Laws, the authors termed them as "poorly drafted," "astonishing," "ambiguous," "controversial," "…a wrong inflicted on Pakistan's minorities," "draconian" and called their existence "sordid" and a "monstrosity." Majority of these columnists saw the Laws as dangerous and prone to societal anarchy citing previous cases of blasphemy. It is important to remember that these descriptions are in line with the discourse that came about after Salman Taseer's press conference, where he termed Aasia's sentence "strict" and "cruel." To sum it, during event A, the Dawn columnists seemed unanimous in openly criticizing the Laws.

According to a report by International Media Support, *Daily Jang* has a moderate conservative leaning and due to its wide circulation, it can be seen as representing the views and opinions of the majority in Pakistan. Looking at the columns with that understanding offers insight on the opinions of the majority of Pakistan's populace. While no one attacked Asia Bibi, the columnists in *Daily Jang* during Event A, were extremely offended by Salman Taseer for terming the Blasphemy Laws as a "black law." The columnists insisted that the proclamation was tantamount to spreading *fitna* (tribulation) in the society and was a propaganda against the Muslim ideology of the country. All columnists insisted that the Laws were a strong impediment to anarchy as they stopped people from taking law into their own hands. The columnists further insisted that the Laws actually protected the minorities by ensuring that an authority confirmed the accusation before imposing a punishment. Yet again, the majority were seen to be unanimous in recognizing the Laws as something that ensured order and peace within the society. An extract from a column published on 25th of December 2010 summarizes the argument in these words: "This Laws provides protection to many people. One has to wait for the decision of the court and the implementation of its ruling. Otherwise, in case of blasphemy, every faithful believes that they are fully capable to act:

when they see, hear something (blasphemous), they can follow the footsteps of Hazrat Umer Farooq[32] and prove his faith (by executing the blasphemer)."

Timeline B onwards, columnists from the Dawn were seen to slightly reorient their discussions by focusing more on the murder of Salman Taseer than an outright criticism of the Blasphemy Laws. The debate around the Laws seemed to revolve around their nature and potential alteration and less on a blatant call for their removal. The columnists termed the Blasphemy Laws as "man-made," "medieval," "vague" and claimed that they, "in their current form," fueled bigotry.

The dominant narrative in *Daily Jang*'s columns for the same timeframe however emphasized that the Laws were spiritual and an essential part of a Muslim's individual and societal psyche. While neither newspaper published any column that explicitly supported Mumtaz Qadri's actions, a majority in *Daily Jang* columns did insist that the murder only took place because a) Taseer had intervened in the process of the court and b) the state, due to its failure to fully implement the Laws, was responsible for any anarchy. It is important to note here that neither newspaper's columnists were unanimous in their opinions for Timeline B and C. Exceptions were observed in both cases, where some columnists in *Daily Jang* admitted that the Laws were leading to anarchy. Similarly, some columnists in Dawn emphasizing that there was a deeply religious connection with the Laws by quoting scriptures, rebuked Salman Taseer for being careless with his words. The fact that there is a relative diversity and variation in opinions amidst the same newspapers is an interesting finding and will be elaborated upon later in the discussion.

Chapter 6.3: Religion/Religious Authorities

The writeup hereunder will present how the Dawn and *Daily Jang* columnists speak about/refer to Religion/Religious authorities throughout timelines A, B and C.

Timeline A (Taseer critiques Blasphemy Laws):

Dawn Newspaper. For timeline A, the columnists in Dawn, addressing the audience that identifies with ''muslimness,'' expressed concern on how the religious leaders misused their influence. They recognized the significant role of *Ulemas* (Religious leaders) as opinion-makers in the society and gave examples of this. For instance, a columnist, reminded the reader of a certain episode on a private TV channel where the invited *Ulemas* were

[32] Hazrat Umer Farooq was the second caliph of Islam. According to tradition, Prophet Muhammad passed a decision on a matter. One of the parties refused to accept Muhammad's decision. Umer Farooq found this disrespectful to Muhammad and beheaded the non-compliant man. A verse (4:65) was revealed later that justified Umer's anger and required Muslims to give in to Muhammad's decisions without argument.

speaking about Ahmadis[33]. The TV anchor, as per the columnist, "almost urged" the *Ulemas* "to declare the Ahmadis as *wajibulqatal* (heretics worthy of death)." Within days two Ahmadis were murdered (E20112010_1a). While discussing the hurried legalities, when the Laws were implemented, a columnist claimed that there was no proper debate on the issue as their proponents insisted that punishment on blasphemy was a nondebatable subject. However, the same columnist also quoted Mr. Ismail Qureshi, the law minister in the government that implemented the Laws, as saying that "some *Ulemas* argued that blasphemy was a forgivable offence" (E25122010_1a). This difference of opinion was not deliberated upon.

The columnists writing during Timeline A were very optimistic about the bill presented in the national assembly by Sherry Rehman[34] who was termed "courageous" (E30122010_1a). They appealed to their readers to pressurize their local representatives to support the bill in the parliament. Later, commenting on the petition against Rehman filed in the Supreme Court, a columnist expressed dismay on the power the "orthodox elements" could exercise on a prominent member of National Assembly. The same columnist blamed the country's media, military and judiciary for tolerating the increasing influence of the orthodox mindset (E31122010_1a). Other columnists urging on the same narrative blamed the state for shrinking the options and avenues available to the segment of the society which would want the Laws to be amended. By either ignoring their growing power, appeasing to them for political purposes or simply being intimidated by them, they columnist argued that the state allowed the "vocal minority" to drown out the views of the majority. For instance:

> Even if it is assumed that the majority of Pakistanis would support the amendments to the blasphemy law, the tools at their disposal to hold back the vocal minority are despicably meager. (E04012011_1a)

Daily Jang Newspaper. The columnists in *Daily Jang* mostly spoke about the Law's spiritual roots in Timeline A. The narrative was dedicated to counter Taseer's remarks of calling the Laws as "black law" and his claim that the death penalty was too harsh as a punishment. Some of the columnists while appealing to the 'muslimnees' identification of the reader, mentioned quotes from the Quran and *hadith* (sayings and actions of Prophet

[33] A sub-sect of muslims. Please see Chapter 3 for more details

[34] Sherry Rehman is a woman politician belonging to the Pakistan People Party, a centre-left party. Rehman is considered one of the most liberal political leaders in Pakistan polarity and has often spearheaded bills that seek rights for women, minorities etc. She embodies the ideal of a liberal, modern, slightly western-oriented political leader. Most of the controversies around her have been due to this label.

Muhammad) to justify the Laws. For instance, a columnist declared that "in the light of Muslim history, there is only one punishment for one who blasphemes against Prophet Muhammad: death" (U29112010_2a). Other columnists emphasized on the respect Prophet Muhammad deserved, insisting that "only Prophet can forgive the blasphemer" (U28112010_2a, U30112010_2a). Some columnists compared the Blasphemy Laws with Holocaust laws, inquiring why the former got a different reaction even when both pertained to religious sentiments. For instance:

> Check the contradiction that including France, Germany, Australia, Switzerland, Holland and Israel many countries consider denial of Holocaust illegal and yet if Blasphemy Laws in Muslim countries declare defamation of Prophet Muhammad illegal, proponents of human rights start complaining (U29112010_1a).

Timeline B (Qadri assassinates Taseer):

Dawn Newspaper. Identifying readers as civilized people, the columnists in Dawn drew a distinct wedge between them and the "religious parties," "religious right," "extremists" and the "fundamentalists." While the columnists often seemed worried about the "revulsion deficit" they recognized that those "who speak for justice" become "vulnerable to a ritual sacrifice" (E11012011_1b, E13012011_1b, E28012011_1b). They condemned "*Ulemas*" and "religious parties" for condoning Qadri's actions by either refusing to condemn the act or for "supporting what the assassin has done" (E07012011_2b). The columnists in Dawn also criticized the government and other state infrastructure for not pushing back against 'fear-mongering fundamentalists' (E11012011_1b). While many rooted *Ulema's* political involvement in General Zia-ul-Haq's[35] government, they offered different reasons for the lasting relevance of the ideology today. Some columnists wrote that these groups managed to gain an audience because they gave an impression that "a godless, secular, westernized left (was) trying to take the country away from its traditional -Muslim and Islamic roots" and they alone held a "monopoly on religious matters" (E13012011_1b, E15012011_2b). Others insisted that the religious parties intimidated those who challenged them "using threats…instead of logic" and then, used this fear as a "route to power" (E07012011_1b, E05012011_1b). However, there were others who had a different answer to why these groups remained powerful. For instance:

[35] An army dictator, General Zia-ul-Haq was very religious and infused religious laws in the constitution during his tenure. He is largely credited for the increased intolerance in Pakistan today. Please see Chapter 3.

> A combination of a population raised on a diet of hate, mistrust and distorted beliefs; a state system that is invested in perpetuating certain kinds of mindsets; a political class that is too self-absorbed to think about overhauling state and society; and the imperatives of ratings, subscriptions and ad revenue — all these factors combine to ensure a certain kind of media output, the dominance of a particular kind of worldview. (E28012011_1b)

Explanations offered by such columnists credited the environment available to such groups as pretext to their relevance. In such narratives, the State itself was held largely responsible for "appeasing" the "fundamentalists" by giving into their world view. The State was constantly criticized for being subdued on policies and principled stands. For example, the bill presented by Sherry Rehman on amendment of the Blasphemy Laws was dropped after Taseer's death as the government offered "no support for the bill" (E10012011_1b). Similarly, the government was criticized for disallowing a motion condemning the murder of Taseer (E31012011_1b). By underplaying its reaction to the murder of Taseer, the columnists accused the state of "legitimizing the extremists'" version of Islam (E09022011_1b). The blame, however. was not targeted to the current government alone. Previous governments, both civilian and military, were indicated to have "shut their eyes to what (was) being taught at educational institutions" and doing little to "oppose the infrastructure of *Jihad*" (E07012011_1b, E06012011_1b). Moreover, the judiciary too got a share of the blame as it seldom punished "ideological killers" leading to the institution's failure to "bring to justice those who dispense justice based on their myopic reading of Islam" (E07012011_1b, E03032011_1b). Television media and Urdu newspapers were also criticized for giving more coverage to hard-liners for better ratings (E15012011_2b, E07012011_1b, E14032011_1b). Similarly, the columnists blamed the military for being "fundo-supporting"[36] and considering the "*jihadis*" as "assets" to fight their proxy wars against Pakistan's enemies (E06012011_1b, E10012011_1b).

Some of the columnists, however, took a different tone by identifying the readers as a peaceful *ummah* (Muslim community) and arguing that "extremists" and "fundamentalists" did not represent true Islam. Islam, such columnists argued, historically "preached tolerance and diversity of faith in the most unequivocal terms" (E03032011_1b). Similar narratives highlighted how the Prophet Muhammad managed to nurture and sustain a peaceful society

[36] A derogatory term in English for fundamentalist extremists

in *Madina*[37] along with the Jews. Islam was recognized here as a liberator, a religion bringing liberty and freedom which was before restricted to the Jewish population. For instance, the Jews were said to be living under Muslim "protection" free from "prosecution at the hands of the medieval Christians in Europe and Byzantium" (E03032011_1b). Hence, it was argued that the followers of Islam had no religious justification to discriminate, attack or kill non-Muslims. Criticizing the Blasphemy Laws, which were recognized to target the non-Muslim population, some columnists, quoting the "more sober Islamic Scholars", argued that these Laws had "few, if any, historical and theological precedents or justifications" (E08012011_1b). Urging the *Ummah* to follow the right teachings of Islam, such columnists declared that the "practitioners of violence in the name of religion...brought Islam into disrepute" (E03032011_1b).

Daily Jang Newspaper. It is in Timeline B, where the most contrast is observed between the columnists (and the assumed) readership between the two newspapers. While the columnists in *Daily Jang* used religion as an authority in several ways, the imagery mostly stayed consistent where there was a clash between the "West" and Islam or a clash between the "liberal" segments and "traditional" segments within the Pakistani society. A majority of the columnists described the "liberals" as "secular," "foreign educated," and "faithless" "enemies of Islam" who wanted to "dereligionize" the society. For instance:

Pioneers of enlightenment, NGO funded liberals, vocal, more educated, more endowed economically, elite, better connected with global networks, close to western education usually have a greater coverage on media. Due to connections, these people can also be seen as part of the global propaganda machinery which is helped by the international media industry (U09012011_1b).

All columnists, regardless of their views on the murder of Salman Taseer, insisted that the Blasphemy Laws were an essential part of Islam and must remain as part of the country's constitution. The narratives firmly established the Laws as "holy laws" basing their roots in religious scripture and religious and national history. Appealing to the muslimness identification of the readers, these columnists used three authorities to justify the existence of the Laws: religion, history and their support amongst the Pakistani populace. The columnists insisted on the spirituality of the Laws by quoting numerous passages from *Quran* as well as sayings and actions of Prophet Muhammad and his companions. In such arguments, the

[37] A city in Saudia Arabia. Prophet Muhammad migrated to Madinah and established an Islamic way of governance there.

imagery was that of the 'liberal fascists[38]' and "seculars" were trying to undermine Islam for instance U16012011_3b, U07012011_4b, U09012011_1b and U12012011_4b. Several columnists used the example of Prophet Muhammad's conquest of *Makkah*[39] to put to end to any argument against the Blasphemy law. According to the 'well-sourced' *hadiths*, Prophet Muhammad, on his conquest of his hometown, *Makkah*, forgave everyone except those who "mocked" and "jeered" at him. While quoting the *Quran*, some columnist referred to verses where 'God himself was angry at those who insulted Prophet Muhammad' (U10012011_2b). The respect for Prophet Muhammad and hence the Blasphemy Laws was taken in these narratives as one of the two foundations of Islam and indeed "a matter of faith" (U08012011_2b). The Blasphemy Laws, these columnists argued, were holy laws, so it was meaningless to debate on them (U06012011_2b). One columnist, angry at Salman Taseer's attempt at putting the Laws to discussion, termed him simply "unworthy to (even) talk about them" (U16012011_3b). Another columnist opinioned that the existence of Laws was based on concrete religious facts so they didn't even require an *"ijtihad"*[40] (U10012011_2b).

These same columnists and others also used historical events as authorities for their arguments. The historical events cited to support the existence of the Laws usually revolved around Iqbal[41]. For instance, one columnist detailed an incident where a student of Iqbal called Prophet Muhammad "sahib" (sir). Iqbal found this very disrespectful and demanded the student to leave. According to the columnist, Iqbal was in a disturbed mental state due to this for many days afterwards (U11012011_1b). Similarly, some columnists used Jinnah as a historical authority by insisting that the Laws were in line with his vision of the country. According to these narratives, Jinnah recognized that such sensitive matters required special laws and he himself was a proponent for them. For instance:

> …. (In one incident) where everyone wanted to give a shoulder to the dead body of a person who killed for Prophet Muhammad's honor, there was shooting by the British (security). Jinnah insisted that it was an error of judgement and people should be more careful about such sensitive matters (U21012011_1b).

[38] A derogatory term used to describe Pakistanis with liberal views

[39] A city in Saudia Arabia and Prophet Muhammad's birthplace. He migrated from Makkah to Madina where he established a form of Islamic government. Later he went back to Makkah and 'conquered' it.

[40] vague issues are open to religions debate amongst scholars which is known as *Ijtehad*

[41] Allama Muhammad Iqbal holds an important position in the history. He is taken as the philosophical father of the country and is said to have been the first one to dream of its existence. A poet, his poems dealt with, amongst other topics, Muslim identity, relation with God and the political place of Islam.

Another columnist emphasized that Jinnah was a deeply religious person who was always *"ba waduh"* (in ablution) and offered *"tahajjud"* prayers (extra midnight prayers) (U09012011_2b). This implied that the Blasphemy Laws would have made perfect sense to him. These accounts especially challenged those who insisted that Jinnah wanted a secular state.

Finally, some columnists also tried to justify the existence of the Laws in the constitution of Pakistan with statistics. These columnists employed the democratic principle of majority as an authority in their narrative, insisting that the Laws correctly represented the views and opinions of the majority of Pakistan's population. According to these columnists, as many as 90%-98% of the country's population agreed on the Laws and did not want any changes in them (U08012011_1b, U08012011_2b, U08012011_4b). Critically, the columnists did not translate devotion to Prophet Muhammad as only emotional. Trying to appeal to the rational identification of the reader, they insisted that the capital punishment was completely rational (U16012011_3b). Those who discouraged Qadri-like actions suggested that he got emotional but that others shouldn't and let the state and judiciary punish the blasphemer for instance U06012011_2b, U08012011_1b.

While no columnist explicitly termed Salman Taseer's murder as a celebratory event, a large majority of the columnists in *Daily Jang* did not condemn it either. Again, different authorities were used for different actor identifications. To appeal to the readers as part of the muslimness, the columnists cited religious scripture that not only justified the Laws but also rationalized the award of capital punishment (U10012011_2b). These columnists insisted that the case of blasphemy was unique and should not be thought of "conventionally" (U07012011_4b). "The devotion just isn't emotional but is a result of 1400 years long studies, caution, research, and agreement" (U16012011_3b). And again:

> "…attempts are being made to normalize blasphemy within the society by encouraging tolerance, love, acceptance and forgiveness. However, 800 million emotional Muslims are not so naïve that they forget the love for Prophet Muhammad" (U11012011_1b).

Appealing to the muslimness identification of their readership, the columnists blended events of history in the narratives, embellishing them with spirituality. For instance, one columnist gave the back story of Ilm-ud-din [42]where he told that Ilm-ud-din and his friends

[42] Ilm-ud-din killed the publisher of a blasphemous book in 1923 in British controlled India. His action prompted the British to put an early version of the Blasphemy Laws in the Indian Penal Code. Ilm-ud-din holds

tossed a coin three times to decide who would commit the murder and all three times, he won; implying that he was destined by God to commit the act. The author further narrated that when his body was exhumed after 15 days, it was still fresh and no decomposition had taken place (U12012011_3b). Another columnist dedicated a long narrative glorifying Amir Cheema, a Pakistani student studying in Germany, who, in 2006, tried to attack the editor of a German newspaper who printed blasphemous cartoons of Prophet Muhammad and, eventually, committed suicide in the jail. Interviews and conversations with Amir's father were repeated in the column dedicated to admiring the "incomparably noble" act his son had committed (U19012011_1b). One columnist dictated the *Ummah* to not act like the followers of Jesus who "left him alone when he was crucified." The columnist reminded the reader that "a real and passionate follower of Prophet Muhammad must be ready to give away his life for Him" (U11012011_1b). Some of these columnists quoted western scholars, with special emphasis on their alma meters to engage the portion of the audience who associated themselves with the identification of being civilized and educated, and resonated with the academic hierchy as imagery to their thoughts (U11012011_1b, U16012011_3b).

However, a small percentage of the columnists were also critical of the *Ulemas*. While, yet again, none criticized the Laws or questioned their inclusion in the constitution, there were those, who appealing to the reader identification of being civilized, expressed their criticism of Qadri actions; for becoming emotional and taking the law into his own hand (U06012011_2b, U08012011_2b). Appealing to the Muslim identification of the readership, they also cited a saying of Prophet Muhammad where he said that one murder was equal to the murder of mankind (U08012011_2b). Some suggested that the hype around Qadri was a strategic, political move by the religious right, who were unable to be significant politically before that. For instance, one columnist wondered if the religious parties, who could never unite and hence failed to gain any momentum politically, had finally found a common ground (U12012011_1b, U16012011_2b). Others were less critical and seemed to appreciate their inclusion, insisting that it was important to mainstream religious leaders politically. They'd managed to stop the government from planned revision of the Blasphemy Laws and which was an achievement on its own. They were advised to refrain from "violent protests" to not to give "liberal fascists" fuel for their "poisonous propaganda" (U07022011_1b).

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an integral position in the discourse supporting the Blasphemy Laws and is often quoted as a justification for Qadri-like actions. Please see Chapter 3.

Timeline C (Qadri executed):

Dawn Newspaper. The columnists in Dawn writing during timeline C appeared defiant and relieved. While there was the "moral quandary" of how to react to an execution, all saw the hanging as a much-needed strong statement from the state (E01032016_1c). "So ended a tragic and sordid chapter of Pakistan's history: its fight against extremist vigilantes who believe they have the right to kill," wrote one columnist (E02032016_1c), a few days after the execution of Qadri. Appealing to the segment of readership, who were part of this struggle as well, the columnists were seen to highlight the moral high ground their success entailed. For instance, one columnist detailed that Qadri's actions were neither "Islamic nor moral, as both Islamic law and our Constitution leave no room for vigilantism" (E16032016_1c). Appreciating the state for being on the "right path," the columnists seemed optimistic about the future. Eventually, one columnist predicted, Pakistan could "take its place in the community of democratic modern nations where all it citizens enjoy equal rights regardless of their faith, gender or ethnicity" (E05032016_1c). The "swiftness of Qadri's execution" surprised most of the columnists especially as the current government was historically center-right. The columnist justified this change in attitude of the government and the burst of "courage" on the backing it received from the military and the courts. For instance:

> The state seemed to have virtually vanished, as a murderer was turned into a cult figure encouraging others of his ilk to kill in the name of faith. The apex court verdict was an attempt to restore the supremacy of the law… perhaps it was also to do with the military's backing for the National Action Plan to counter terrorism and violent religious extremism (E09032016_1c)

However, an equal half of the narrative was dedicated to ponder over the "larger debate" on how extremist elements had gained momentum during Qadri's trial and after his execution. The columnists pointed out how Qadri, in his life and death had brought different religious parties and factions together. There was a competition, one columnist claimed, to show "which political party was best represented at the funeral" (E4032016_1c, E05032016_1c). As "religious politics survives on continuous social activism," some columnists were afraid that the religious parties will "exploit religious sentiments for political purposes" (E13013016_1c). The state was urged to keep vigilant and put a stop to their growing activisms.

Daily Jang Newspaper. Columnists in *Daily Jang* were clearly dejected and did not see Qadri's execution as a success in any form. Some of the columnists complained that even though the government tried to weaken the reaction to Qadri's hanging, the large crowd at his funeral revealed that the punishment failed to bring a "change in the mindset" (U03032016_2c). If that's the objective, they pointed out, "factories that preach hatred" needed to be shut down (U05032016_1c). However, other columnists had a different response to the execution. "Pakistan is unique in the Muslim world because it was blessed with the most love for the Prophet Muhammad" wrote one columnist. Hence, people would be offended if someone insulted Him. "Qadri too, like a typical Pakistani, felt offended and could not tolerate what Taseer said" (U04032016_1c). Another columnist, touching on the nationalist and muslimness identification of the readers, asked if they would be offended if someone said anything against Jinnah. If so, the columnist pleaded, why wouldn't one react when Prophet Muhammad was insulted? (U11032016_1c). A columnist insisted that had the government not been in such a hurry to execute Qadri, the *Ulemas* would have come up with a better arrangement for both the parties such as *deet* (blood money). Clearly, the columnist did not agree with the execution of Qadri and pointed towards the questionable intentions of the government (U04032016_1c). Such columnists contextualized their arguments in the imagery of a clash between the "West" and Pakistan where the former influenced the government to act. More of this imagery is observed in the writeups pertaining to law and international influence (see below), where these columnists questioned the state's commitment to local laws as compared to pressure from international entities.

Chapter 6.4: Historical accounts

The writeup hereunder will present how the Dawn and *Daily Jang* columnists speak about/refer to Historical accounts throughout timelines A, B and C.

Timeline A (Taseer critiques Blasphemy Laws):

Dawn Newspaper. There were a few references made to historical accounts by Dawn columnist in Timeline A. One columnist speaking about Jinnah's 11th August 1946 speech insisted that not many amongst the clerics in the country were trained to accept Jinnah's views. The columnist said:

> But talk to clerics or students today, and they will look at you in disbelief and even anger if you impute secularism to the founder of Pakistan. In their view, he created Pakistan in the name of Islam, and not for the Muslims of the subcontinent. (E31122010_1a)

Another columnist gave a generic conclusion on the historical misuse of the Blasphemy Laws of Pakistan. Blaming the State for not keeping a check on how the Laws were used to target non-Muslims, the columnist also complained that the policing and justice system failed to protect the accused even while they were in jail (E20112010_1a). While discussing the formation, and passing of the Blasphemy Laws, another columnist reminded the reader that even the Law minister of the time, Mr. Ismail Qureshi, confessed that "many Islamic-minded members of the Assembly did not wholly agree with the bill because they thought imprisonment for life was sufficient punishment for blasphemy" (E25122010_1a). This legal account provides important historical insight which is why it is referred here and will also be referred under the "Law and Legal" authority.

Daily Jang Newspaper. A columnist in an effort to emphasize how the law of the land for a Muslim population always had to be rooted in the Quran and Sunnah, claimed that the subcontinent was always ruled under Islamic law (U28112010_2a). The Mughals, the author insisted, were pious Muslim rulers who ruled strictly in line with the teachings of the Quran and Sunnah. There was a brief gap during the English rule in the subcontinent but Pakistan again reverted back to the custom of their geographical lineage by becoming an Islamic republic with laws such as the Blasphemy Laws. Similar narratives were observed in other columns, where the writers narrated incidents of Islamic history where the Blasphemy Laws, in some form, were exercised. One columnist told the story of a Caliph during the *Usmania* Caliphate, who warned the French of war against them if they didn't ban a blasphemous theatrical play. According to this columnist, France stopped the play and was left admiring the Caliph for his love and devotion towards his prophet (U07122010_1a). While talking about Salaudin Ayubi[43], a columnist traced the creed of Pakistani Muslims back to him and demanded the readers to stay true to the lineage (U30112010_1a).

A majority of the columnists paid homage to Illm-ud-din. As described in the history section of this document, it was Ilm-ud-din's case that prompted the British to include the blasphemy law in its Indian penal code. All the mentions of Ilm-ud-din also mentioned Allama Iqbal's reaction to the case. Allama Iqbal, as mentioned before, is recognized as the philosophical founder of Pakistan and his legacy plays a major role in formation of the Pakistani identity. Iqbal, who led his funeral prayers, revered Ilm-ud-din for his actions and

[43] Salaudin Ayubi is a famous historical figure in Islamic history. He fought against and defeated the crusaders.

regretted that he himself could not do the same. Earlier, he'd requested Muhammad Ali Jinnah[44] to represent Ilm-ud-din in court.

Some columnists, who wanted to cool the temperature around Taseer, reminded the reader that he was the son of a pious man. "Salman Taseer's father was a renowned Muslim and worldly scholar and friends with *Maulana Attaullah Shah Bukhari*"[45] (U28112010_1a). How could, the columnist asked the audience, the son of a friend of Maulana Attaullah Shah Bukhari do something against Islam? Another, columnist gave Salman Taseer's father a nationalist shade by reminding the reader that he "was also a part of the Kashmir independence struggle by writing poems in its favor" (U28112010_1a).

Timeline B (Qadri assassinates Taseer):

Dawn Newspaper. Dawn columnists employed different actor identifications when they used history as an instrument to convince the reader. Dismayed over the approach the country had taken, the columnists spent considerable column space trying to argue that the Pakistan of today was not the state the country's founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, envisioned. "We failed the nation, and most of all we failed the creed of the man who made this nation" said one columnist (E22012011_1b). Appealing to the civilized nationalist of the country, the columnists reminded the readers of what Jinnah said in his speeches about the responsibility of the state towards the country's minorities. For instance:

> No civilized government can be run successfully without giving minorities a complete sense of security and confidence. They must be made to feel that they have a hand in government and to this end must have adequate representation in it (E16012011_1b).

Hence the state was held responsible for ensuring that the minorities don't feel "any apprehension of any injustice being done to them" (E16012011_1b). With these verbatim, the columnists reminded the State to take its role as a protector of the minorities. Some, however, insisted on the more secular version of statehood, where the state stood neutral to religious differences. Using Jinnah again, such columnists insisted that the founder "did not want to mix state matters and religion" (E07012011_2b). Blaming the State for the division in the society, they claimed that the discrimination apparent in society today was a result of an "us" and "them" approach which was historically "state enforced" (E30032015_1b). Amongst them, one columnist was found to also use religious history to convince the reader of the

[44] The founder of Pakistan. Please see Chapter 3.

[45] Maulana Attaullah Shah Bukhari was a founding father of Majlis-e-Ahrar-e-Islam, a movement historically known to be against the Ahmaddiya movement.

rights of the minorities. Appealing to the muslimness identification of the reader, this columnist insisted that "so far as we are concerned, our own history and our Prophet Muhammad has given the clearest proof that non-Muslims have been treated not only justly and fairly but generously" (E30032015_1b).

Daily Jang Newspaper. For timeline B, the columnists in *Daily Jang* infused religion with history and simultaneously appealed to the actor identifications of muslimness, Civilized and nationalist amongst their readership. As mentioned, the columnists in *Daily Jang* recounted previous incidents of blasphemy and their reactions. They cited the cases of Ilm-ud-din and Amir Cheema. Appealing to the patriotic Pakistani, the writers used historical national figures such as Iqbal and Jinnah to provide context to their arguments. Iqbal was shown as a strong proponent of the need to ensure respect of Prophet Muhammad and to punish those who blaspheme (U06012011_2b, U11012011_1b, U12012011_3b). Jinnah was represented as a pious Muslim, who would have supported the Laws (U09012011_2b). Answering those who questioned if there was a need for the Blasphemy Laws in a Muslim majority country, the columnists used the case of "Heavenly Communism" to support their arguments on the affirmative. The "blasphemous" book was published by a lawyer during Zia-ul-Haq's tenure. The book was supposedly very offensive and prompted the movement to strike off the choice of life imprisonment as punishment for Blasphemy, leaving only capital punishment behind. The columnists appealing to the readers who'd think of the Laws as a religious propaganda, reminding them that this particular movement was not headed by a religious individual but an 'open minded' member of a leftist party. Hence, even the "liberals" wanted the Laws and agreed with the punishment. (U11012011_1b). Other columnists maintained the same arguments by reminding the reader that the "liberal" Zulifqar Ali Bhutto[46] too "recognized the importance of Islam" and reflecting on what "the population wanted, integrated Islamic values and laws in the country's constitution" (U24122015_1b). The protests against the Laws, according to these columnists, were only "instigated by America and Europe" (U11012011_1b).

A very small minority employed history as an authority to appeal to the readers by infusing religion in the narrative. Citing Jinnah, these columnists stated that Jinnah "was opposed to the idea of a theological state." Another columnist reminded the reader of the rich

[46]It is notable that Bhutto was the country's first 'left-oriented', self-proclaimed 'socialist', leader. For more information, please refer to Chapter 3.

Muslim history urging the society to be more open minded and tolerant of different views and opinions. For instance:

> When we were open-minded back in the 11th century, we weren't offended with people because we understood their different backgrounds. When we became narrow minded, that was the downfall of Islam. The society of today is becoming an enemy of knowledge. (U09012011_3b)

Timeline C (Qadri executed):

Dawn Newspaper. The columnists of Dawn did not use History as an authority in timeline C as much as they did in previous timelines. Only one columnist reflected on how the "state patronage allowed religious extremism to flourish in this country and produce a culture where murder in the name of faith was glorified." Reminding the state and the reader that escaping the repercussions was to be a "long haul," he urged that it was a much-needed exercise. Otherwise, the columnist warned, the spread of extremism and intolerance "threatened" the survival of the state (E09032016_1c).

Daily Jang Newspaper. None of the columnists in *Daily Jang* touched upon history as an authority to make an argument in timeline C.

Chapter 6.5: Law and Legal

The writeup hereunder will present how the Dawn and *Daily Jang* columnists speak about/refer to Law and Legal throughout timelines A, B and C.

Timeline A (Taseer critiques Blasphemy Laws):

Dawn Newspaper. The Laws, according to some columnists who were very critical to them, were a result of a hurried and unconstitutional process. One columnist, while explaining the history of their implementation, quoted the Law minister of that time saying that "many Islamic minded members of the assembly did not wholly agree with the bill because they thought that imprisonment for life was sufficient punishment for blasphemy" (E25122010_1a).

Time and time again, many columnists urged that the problems faced by the accused were not limited to their treatment during trial. Several of the accused, who were acquitted by the courts, had to relocate or would live under tremendous social pressure or be killed by some unknown assailants. Blasphemy, in that sense, became a life-long curse that stayed with them throughout their lives.

Daily Jang Newspaper. *Daily Jang*'s columnists were strictly against Salman Taseer's intervention in Asia Bibi's case and saw his move as anarchy. Two years earlier, in

2009, the judiciary was involved in a historic "Lawyer's movement" meant to make the judicial system free from the influence of politicians. As it was free from these bindings in 2011, some columnists argued that the strong and independent judiciary was fully capable to check any misuses or influence of the Laws, hence there was no need for an intervention by the governor. Aasia Bibi, they insisted, was sentenced to death after due legal process not by conventional or traditional means such as a *fatwa*[47]or a *Jirga*[48] (U25112010_2a). To prove this, one columnist dedicated his column to repeating the words of the investigating officer with his name and his title, challenging the readers to confirm the content. According to the report, Aasia admitted that she had, in fact, committed blasphemy in front of the elders of her community and had also sought forgiveness from *Qari*[49]*Salim*, the imam of her village who'd lodged the complaint against her. The same columnist then reminded the readers that the punishment for death, besides being a unanimous agreement amongst different religious groups, had also been agreed upon by both houses of parliament after an "intense debate," and was also recommended by the Federal Shariat Court (U25112010_1a). In another column, an author mentioned the name and titles of the judges of the Federal Shariat Court, emphasizing on their credentials and explaining how the decision on punishment of death was not an outcome of an emotional outburst but was formed after much contemplation by seasoned minds. This way, the columnists attempted to convince the readers that the Laws and the punishment were in line with both religious traditions and state's legislative requirements.

Timeline B (Qadri assassinates Taseer):

Dawn Newspaper. Columnists in Dawn engaging the identification towards being a civilized nationalist, used the state law or the constitution as authorities in their arguments. The narratives here were strict in questioning why "state functionaries are losing the will to uphold the law" even if it dealt with sensitive issues. By being "afraid of checking any transgression of the law committed under the cover of belief," the government was blamed for the eventual "extremely deleterious effects" (E09022011_1b). The columnists also contested that the judiciary fell short of being "independent, impartial and competent tribunal" in blasphemy cases due to security issues. For instance:

[47] A religious decree.
[48] A traditional form of court where the elders of the city or the family get together and decide and impose a decision.
[49] Title for a religious teacher

> Judges who hear blasphemy cases are often harassed and threatened to convict the suspects. Some judges have reported receiving letters and phone calls warning them of attacks against themselves and their families if defendants in blasphemy cases are acquitted (E26042015_1b).

Criticizing the government for this situation, columnists questioned the State's intentions to treat the blasphemy accused fairly. They urged the State to ensure that the "right to independent judiciary is (not) reduced to rhetoric." Using the upholding of Qadri's punishment by the Supreme Court as an authority, the columnists appreciated the reader for condemning a "self-professed murderer." These columnists confirmed that the country's leading judges agreed with them when they ruled that "criticizing blasphemy law does not amount to blasphemy" and "no one has the right to take the law into his own hands" (E14102015_1b). Other columnists critiqued the Laws and presented a number of issues in them. For example, they was termed to be "vague". This claim was directly in line with the Supreme Court's ruling that "the language of the statute, and, in particular, a statute creating an offence, must be precise, definite and sufficiently objective so as to guard against an arbitrary and capricious action on part of the state functionaries…" The clarity in the language of the Laws was deemed essential both in line with "Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan, as well as international human rights law, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" (E10042015_1b). The "vague and broad wordings of the provision" made the Laws vulnerable to subjective interpretations which, in turn, allowed people to exploit them. The narrative, in general, demanded of the state to make the language of the Laws more concrete while making the trial process fairer with respect to an independent judiciary.

Daily Jang Newspaper. The columnists in *Daily Jang*, when using Law as an authority, appealed to the readers who identified themselves as law abiding, civilized citizens. Not condemning Salman Taseer's murder, the columnists instead shone light on the fact that his actions themselves were anarchical. By stepping in, the columnists contested that he did more harm to Asia Bibi's case than good. For instance:

> Salman Taseer should have respected the verdict of the court and let due process take its place even if Asia Bibi was innocent. Higher courts always give accused the benefit of the doubt. (U08012011_1b)

Even those who either knew him personally or admired him, criticized him for his stance and actions and term them "unconstitutional" (U12012011_2b). The columnists yet

again urged the readers to realize that the Laws were a representation of the view of the majority and they formed an "important" part of the country's legal system (U08012011_1b). Moreover, these Laws were not a product of popular support from the religious section of the society alone. Walking readers through the formation of the Laws and their evolution, the columnists emphasized that "individuals from all walks of life agree with the Laws" (U13012011_2b).

Others provided statistics on the number of accused who were given capital punishment. "In 23 years, no one's been given a death punishment. This proves that either the cases were not strong enough or they didn't hold to the requirements of justice of the law. This alone is enough proof of its transparency" (U09012011_1b). Some columnists, however, did admit that the Laws were misused, but they were still very critical on those who propose their annulment due to the misuse. Such narratives wondered why only the Blasphemy Laws were especially "targeted" when numerous other laws were misused (U09012011_1b). Furthermore, given the existence of other laws that ensured respect to numerous national institutions, the columnists wondered why those who oppose the Blasphemy Laws had issues with them alone. For instance:

> The country has many other laws that provide protection against contempt of the president, the governors, army, judiciary so why only have issues with the one that demands the same for the best of all worlds…Prophet? (U07012011_4b).

Demanding their continued existence, the columnists offered solutions to avoid their misuse. The narratives largely insisted that the execution of judgments on the Laws must be through legal procedures and not anarchic, for instance U06012011_2b. Similarly, a columnist termed their misuse as the greatest "disservice" done to the Laws (U09012011_5b). To counter these, the columnists proposed solutions such as complementary laws that could check against their misuse, for instance U09012011_1b, U15012011_2b. Such narratives further suggested that any implementation of *sharia* must come through "reform via the state" and not individually (U06012011_2b). However, no columnist suggested a direct amendment.

A column published after the Supreme Court upheld Qadri's death sentence, called the ruling 'important' to solve the "issue to intolerance issue in the society which has been there for 40 years." The columnist saw the decision in a wider perspective of the state

reestablishing its writ across different fronts[50]. As a concluding sentence, the columnist reiterated the judge when he said that "criticism on Blasphemy Laws is not blasphemy" (U14022015_1b).

Timeline C (Qadri executed):

Dawn Newspaper. Columnists in Dawn made significant use of Law as authority in timeline C. After all, Qadri's sentencing and hanging was a win for "justice." The columnists, spoke about how the state had to guarantee the rights of the citizens and uphold its constitutional commitments. For instance:

> The state must also establish its credentials as the one entity that is committed to enforcing the law without discrimination and restoring law and order to a country wracked for years by lawlessness. (E05032016_1c)

Basing their arguments on the imagery that the "road forward is an inclusive and a progressive Pakistan," the columnists demanded that all political forces must come together to ensure rule of law (E03032016_1c). In such a Pakistan, the law will take its due course and will be "enforced with single-mindedness of purpose." The columnists emphasized that the judgement given on the Qadri case was not exceptional and the courts simply ruled as they would with anyone. Instruments of the state, the columnists reminded the reader, were "not individual; they are instead based on procedure and process, the product of which is justice" (E2032016_1c).

Some columnists were dismayed over the support Qadri received from the lawyers and judges given they were the forbearers of justice. Another columnist complained how the "religious circles" labeled any act of reform as "acts of liberalization" meant to please the West' and hence impeding the process (E13032016_1c). Insisting on the seriousness of the situation, one columnist pleaded that attempts need to be made to ensure that "Qadri does not morph into a legend to inspire future generations." The only way to do this, the columnist argued, was that the government "found its voice and loudly proclaim what kind of Pakistan it is committed to building" and the military "visibly buries its history of using religious militancy as a tool in foreign adventures" (E03032016_1c).

Daily Jang Newspaper. Columnists in *Daily Jang,* who used Law as authority, unanimously pointed towards a foreign power influencing the State to execute Qadri. The "swiftness of the execution" had seemingly left these columnists in a shock. Strange, opined one columnist, capital punishment takes many years but Qadri got executed in only five

[50] The State started an armed campaign in tribal areas on its western border to end terrorism.

years. Qadri, this columnist insisted did what he did because the State failed to act on the Blasphemy Laws. (U04032016_1c). Another columnist asked why the same "swiftness" was not applicable to "the blasphemy convicts, Raymond Davis and those who helped and betrayed the country in the Abbottabad raid [by US-led forces, and that resulted in the capture and killing of Osama bin Laden] [51]" (U03032016_1c). Again, the columnist implied that the execution was not unfair and those championing "justice" needed to deal with all criminals in the same manner. "What sort of justice is this," asked the same columnist, "that Qadri will get executed while the case of Aasia Bibi gets prolonged?"

International lens

The writeup hereunder will present how the Dawn and *Daily Jang* columnists speak about/refer to International lens throughout timelines A, B and C.

Timeline A: (Taseer critiques Blasphemy Laws)

Dawn *Newspaper*. When criticizing the Laws, some columnist compared them with international terrorist organizations that were conducting targeted genocides. Building up on the claim that the Laws were made specifically to target non-Muslim population, the columnists urged that the targeted harassment was similar to what the Islamic State of Iraq had declared when they announced that "all Christian centers, organizations and institutions, leaders and followers are legitimate targets of the *Mujahideen*[52]" (E20112010_1u).

Writing about the implications of the Laws on fundamental rights of people, the columnists argued that the Laws did not convince human rights advocates of any protection to the minorities as is often insisted by their proponents. On the contrary, the activists found that the Laws basically provided "an avenue through which all manner of personal or political vendettas can be avenged" (E24122010_1a). The same columnists also mentioned that these organizations and activists were actively seeking a presidential pardon for Aasia Bibi. Other columnists were more worried about the mixed signals the country sent to the international community. "We send out simultaneous signals of modernity and medievalism, but at the end of the day, the latter drowns out the former," announced one columnist (E27122010_1a). Another insisted that "we have given ourselves (a name), by our own actions most of all… not a very good one" (E30122010_1a). Some of the columnists were dejected that the

[51] This is in reference to Dr. Shakeel Afridi who helped CIA to confirm Osama Bin Laden's presence inside the house by conducting a fake polio campaign. He has been labelled a traitor of Pakistan for this action.
[52] soldiers of God

"conservative opinion" had not taken the Pope's plea in "proper spirit" (E25122010_1a, E20112010_1a).

Daily Jang Newspaper. The columnists in *Daily Jang* mostly saw the international community as an entity which was at loggerheads against the local traditions. For instance, one columnist complained that the international powers were trying to change laws that were in accordance with local national opinions (U29112010_1a). Another columnist furthered this by saying that the "West" seems to have an obsession for "manipulating the love of Prophet Muhmmad from amongst the Muslim communities worldwide" (U05122010_1a). Similarly, it was complained that those who go against local or Islamic laws found refuge in "America, Europe and Scandinavian countries" where they were offered many luxuries (U25112010_2a). Criticizing those who let go of their traditional roots, the columnists offered much disdain for them. For instance:

> These times, philosophically, are victim today of the strictly mental approach of rationality. Muslims too on being impressed, fall prey to it and lose their faith, their devotion towards God and Prophet Muhammad. Instead of gauging oneself and one's actions with the commands of religion, they embrace the European way of thinking and in the way, lose their respect and independence. (U30112010_2a).

Timeline B (Qadri assassinates Taseer):

Dawn Newspaper. Columnists in Dawn who used International phenomenon as authorities, appealed to the civilized nationalist who, they believed, valued international conventions and commitments. Although they did not explicitly insist that the Laws challenged modernization, their arguments could be seen to imply just that. Most of the narratives in such writings, for example, pointed at the contrast of local trends, especially those pertaining to the Blasphemy Laws of Pakistan, to international expectations. For instance:

> Pakistan's blasphemy Laws are inconsistent with a number of human rights including freedom of expression; freedom of thought, conscience and religion; and equal protection of the law, which have all been well documented by human rights groups. (E01042015_1b).

The narratives argued that in case of scrutiny, the Laws could easily be "discredited within the international rights framework." Bringing the same argument of ambiguity as discussed in the section under Law/Legal, a columnist quoted the October 2010 Freedom House report saying that the "Pakistan's law lacks safeguards against abuse since it is vague,

offers no clear definitions of blasphemy and has weak evidentiary standards" (E09012011_1b). A similar observation was made by Qadir (2014) in his study where he showed international comparisons being made to define Pakistan as a 'civilized' nation. Some columnists also saw the Laws as designed to target the minority population and saw them in the context of a religious conflict within the country. Urging the reader to follow "Europe and America" in refraining from religious discrimination, one columnist wrote about an incident where the U.S. Department of Justice fought "school authorities for the rights of a Muslim plaintiff," staying true to "US constitutional commitments to religious equality and freedom". The columnist "advised" Muslim governments to "stop ranting against the West, take a few lessons in citizenship and minority rights from Europe and America" (E04022011_1b).

Pointing out more faults in the Blasphemy Laws and their implementation, some columnists reiterated the need for security of judges to ensure an "impartial tribunal." Citing the concern of "the UN special rapporteur on the independence of the judiciary" who visited Pakistan in 2012, the columnist reveal that judges in blasphemy cases were either "coerced or pressured to decide against the accused" or were "very afraid of public sentiment" (E26042015_1b). The same columnists also gave the example of Justice Pervez Ali Shah who had to leave the country due to threats on his life after awarding Mumtaz Qadri's death penalty. In other words, the columnists engaged the reader to realize how rulings in cases pertaining to the Blasphemy Laws fell short of meeting local or international requirements of the "fundamental aspect of the right to a fair trial" and hence could not be accepted.

Daily Jang Newspaper. The narratives in *Daily Jang* for timeline B depicted the imagery of conflict and this shaped most of the arguments and authorities the columnists employed. Almost all of the columnists saw a conflict between Islam and the "west." "West" encompassed Europe and America for the columnists. The columnists also found conflicts between the "liberals" who were western educated and who "follow(ed) America blindly" (U20012011_3b) and the local traditional populace. Another obvious conflict in the narrative was between the insistence on rationalism dictated by "western propaganda" and the devotion to faith expected of all Muslims. The only mention of NGOs in timeline B was negative where they were blamed for "politicizing" the issue "to collect foreign funds" (U11012011_1b). The columnists also mentioned Pope Benedict several times and criticized him for getting involved in the internal matters of Pakistan. Others called him out for ignoring the prosecutions faced by Muslims in "Christian majority" countries

(U13012011_1b). The columnists insisted that the Laws do not solely target non-Muslims and that calling them "discriminatory" was a "propaganda pursed by the West" (U13012011_2b, U06012011_2b). One columnist in *Daily Jang* insisted that the "west has made toying with the religious sentiments of Muslims it's hobby" (U07012011_4) and demanded of the political leaders to put a stop to it.

Timeline C (Qadri executed):

Dawn Newspaper. For timeline C, only one columnist used the "international" setting as an authority. The emphasis in the narrative was that reforms had to come from within. Reflecting on the efforts, which were put in by the international and transnational entities throughout the Taseer-Qadri trial, the columnist argued they hadn't proved fruitful. "International perceptions are largely irrelevant," the columnist opinioned. This was because Pakistanis believed in a different "reality". The only way to reform was to "change the reality" so that internal efforts lead the country towards the changes. (E02032016_1c).

Daily Jang Newspaper. Columnists writing for *Daily Jang* during timeline C engaged the "international" authority on the premise that foreign powers were involved in the execution of Qadri. Some of the columnists accused America to be the enforcer of Qadri's execution, for instance U04032016_1c, U13032016_1c. The columnists traced this "conversion to liberalization" within the government as well as the army on the influence of America as there has been no historical political struggle for this ideology. The columnists decried the change and warned the government that this would "further break the country" (U03032016_1c).

Chapter 7: Analysis

Chapter 7.1: Epistemic governance: Imageries

Chapter 7.1.1: Competing blocs. Epistemic governance builds on a set of recognizable imageries. The imageries contextualize the narrative and form a crucial part of one's 'reality'. Columnists, when trying to put forth an argument, need to do so in line with the realities of the audience. The imageries provide backdrop to the arguments and the basis on which the columnists can engage in epistemic work. This exercise is almost automatic in nature. At times, the columnists engage in epistemic governance consciously, at times otherwise. And yet, there is a degree of conformity in the practice. Alasuutari and Qadir (2016) suggest that this reliance on imageries is worldwide and is a common trait of modern world culture. The columnists hence engage with 'imageries' because it simply works. They

assume, and indeed correctly so, that the society thinks this way. That, the society understands the world in the context of a specific or a series of images and situations. And, any line of argument will only make sense if it resonates with those perceived imageries.

The imageries identified in the columns of Dawn and *Daily Jang* are widespread. The columnists see Pakistan as a very complex society with several fissures, hierarchies and one bent on evolving into a modern state. The columnists are seen to present these imageries in their narratives as they converse on the Blasphemy Laws throughout the timelines. While the idea for the imageries stays the same, at times, the players change across timelines. These will be presented later.

Columnists across the different timelines and newspapers assume that Pakistan is a divided society. The divisions are widespread across all social and economic classes. Below imageries are enlisted which were observed in the columns of both the newspapers. Imageries that were common across timelines or categories were exempted from the list to avoid repetition. Each imagery has the category and the timeline stated after it.

Dawn	***Daily Jang***
• Courageous politicians such as Sherry Rehman vs Cowardly politicians who stay quiet on the Blasphemy Laws *(Religion, Timeline A)* • Silent majority that is against the Laws vs Vocal Minority (*Religion, Timeline A)* • Vulnerable and peaceful people vs Intimidating and violent religious people *(Religion, Timeline B)* • Godless, secular left vs Pious, traditional and Islamic right *(Religion, Timeline B)* • People who use logic and rationalism vs Religious right that disregards logic *(Religion, Timeline C)* • Those who see Pakistan in line with Jinnah's 11th August Speech vs Those who want to delete the speech from archives *(History,*	• Islamic scholars who find little historical or theological precedents or justifications for the Blasphemy Laws vs Those who think Blasphemy Laws are an integral part of Islam *(Religion, Timeline A)* • Islam vs West *(Religion, Timeline A)* • A Muslim world that respects the Laws vs the rest of the world that disrespects the Laws and yet respects sentiments on Holocaust *(Religion, Timeline A)* • Liberal vs Traditional *(Religion, Timeline B)* • Those who seek to dereligionize, are faithless, seculars vs Those who want a religious society *(Religion, Timeline B)* • Foreign educated and hence separated from local realities vs Local educated traditional individuals *(Religion, Timeline B)*

Timeline A) • Those who think that Laws specifically target Non-Muslims vs Those who don't *(History, Timeline A)* • Those who see State as a protector of Minority rights vs Those who undermines minority rights *(History, Timeline B)* • Those who want to see the society divided into Us (Muslims) and Them (Minorities) vs Those who want a unified society • Those who follow forced and wrong laws vs Those who demand they go through proper process *(Law, Timeline A)* • Those who believe that the Blasphemy Laws can be criticized vs Those who don't *(Law, Timeline B)* • The Laws must be in line with International Human Standards vs Not *(Law, Timeline B)* • Those who see Qadri's execution as a product of law vs Those who don't *(Law, Timeline C)* • Those who take reforms as an internal, natural process vs Those who think that the reforms are forced by the West *(Law, Timeline C)* • Those who see the Law as a tool to avenge vs Not *(International, Timeline A)* • The conservative elements that don't take the Pope's plea in good faith vs Those who do *(International, Timeline A)* • Those who see the state give in to international expectations of rights vs Those who see state as a protector of traditional dogmas *(International, Timeline B)*	• Enemies of Islam vs Saviors of Islam *(Religion, Timeline B)* • NGO sponsored propogandist vs True locals *(Religion, Timeline B)* • Vocal (educated, elite and hence have a more say) vs Poor, uninfluential and subdued *(Religion, Timeline B)* • Upholders of enlightenment and modernity vs traditionalists *(Religion, Timeline B)* • Globally connected modernists and liberals vs local traditionalists *(Religion, Timeline B)* • Elite vs the common Pakistani *(Religion, Timeline B)* • Those who believe in well sourced Hadith vs Heresy *(Religion, Timeline B)* • A rational Muslim who will let the state punish the blasphemer vs an emotional Muslims who would punish the blasphemer themselves *(Religion, Timeline B)* • Those who believe that the Blasphemy Laws are an outcome of emotions alone vs those who believe that the Blasphemy Laws are a result of 1400 years of studies, caution, research and agreement *(Religion, Timeline B)* • Followers of Prophet Mohammad who will always stay with Him vs Followers of Jesus who left Him when he was crucified *(Religion, Timeline B)* • Those who will not violently protest and hence give more propaganda material to liberal fascists vs Those who will be violent in reaction *(Religion, Timeline C)* • Liberal fascists waiting on opportunities to be propogandist vs normal people *(Religion,*

	Timeline C) • Law abiding citizens who respect the constitution and the Law vs Those who don't (*Religion, Timeline C)* • State infrastructure that punished Qadri vs The nationals who still support Qadri *(Religion, Timeline C)* • A state expected to respect local laws and local views vs A state that goes against local laws to appease the west or gives into international pressure *(Religion, Timeline C)* • Those who think that the Law of the land must be based on Quran and Sunnah vs Not *(History, Timeline A)*

Observations on the imagery of competing blocs. The imageries collected above provide an interesting insight into how the columnists think the society imagines the world. As stated above, there were recurring imageries in each newspaper across timelines and categories. These were deleted to avoid repetitions. However, as is observed across timelines, the bigger picture stays the same. For instance, there is a recurring and strong emphasis on the imagery of a conflicting "world" with Pakistan be it in the religious sense, the historical sense, through the lens of Law or with respect to international expectations. The content changes across the timelines but the imagery stays the same.

An interesting observation is how the imageries don't only stay the same across timelines and categories but also across newspapers. As has been described in detail already in chapter 5, the newspapers reach different demographics and have a different set of readership. Dawn usually caters to the elite of the society who are economically and socially well-off. This readership is usually well-educated and more accepting of liberal policies. In contrast, the *Daily Jang* newspaper is the most widely read Urdu newspaper and caters to the more conservative segment of the society. Its readership is usually less endowed economically and socially. In a sense, the two newspapers are on opposite poles of the spectrum politically, economically, and socially. And yet, each share the same imagery form:

a form where there exists a conflict between competing groups and segments. For Dawn, the competing groups are usually the religious extremists—socially backward, illiterate, violent, and emotional—vs modern, progressive, educated, and law abiding citizens. For *Daily Jang*, there exists a conflict between the Western educated seculars, anti-Pakistan, anti-nationals and anti-Islam vs the patriotic protectors of Islam and traditions. This finding reiterate Qadir & Alasuutari (2013), showing that even with varying demographics of the audience and readership and regardless of the ideological tendencies and biases of the columnists, the method of governance stays the same. All columnists believe in the society's tendencies to conflict and find it convenient to massage these beliefs and shape their arguments in line with them to make them more "realistic" to their audience. The study shows that it is immaterial whether the columnists are speaking to highly educated English speaking individuals or to someone who is Urdu speaking and is deeply religious and a staunch traditionalist. The imagery of a conflict eases out the message and merges within the perceived reality of the readership.

Chapter 7.1.2: Hierarchy. The columnists also see Pakistan as a society that is largely hierarchical. Power falls in many layers and different authorities are presumed by the columnists to exercise that power. Circumstances, historical or otherwise, are associated with the failure to act by these authorities. As has been observed with the imageries, this understanding of a hierarchical infrastructure is neither limited to a newspaper, not is it boxed in any timelines. The accounts of these institutions can be found dispersed all around the data.

The State holds an important position in the narratives for it is held responsible for past events, for present conditions and many future expectations are attached to its role. For example, the State is held responsible by several Dawn columnists for the rise in strength of the "fundamentalists" due to its policies of the past. The State is accused of providing "legitimacy and support" to such groups. Similarly, it is blamed to have made the Blasphemy Laws part of the constitution in a rushed manner without due debate on them. The columnists in Dawn have been especially critical of the government for not being open to bringing any amendments in the Laws and being intimidated by the lobbying of religious groups. The Dawn columnists vented out their exasperation against the current government due to its choice to withdraw its proposals of the Law's amendments and for hushing down political steps that condemned the murder of Taseer. Given this stance, columnists blamed the State

for any future "deleterious effects." In timeline C, the Dawn columnists yet again, put the brunt of the narration on the State by commending it for doing the right thing and ensuring the rule of law by executing Qadri. These columnists were insistent that the State further needs to set a precedent where anyone who challenges its writ is awarded a punishment. Just as it must ensure that everyone gets their rights and can live as equal citizens of the country.

The columnists in *Daily Jang* too place much weight of their arguments on the hierarchical power of the state. In timeline A and B, the columnists use the fact that the Laws are part of the constitution of the country as a form of legitimization. In other words, linking them to the approval of the state makes them institutionalized. Throughout the narratives, the proponents of the Laws stand firmly on this justification in timeline A and B. The State is coxed to ensure that the accused are dealt exactly in line with the constitution. The courts too have been appreciated for upholding their commitments as legal authorities and awarding Aasia Bibi her punishment (of death penalty) as was the requirement of the Laws. These columnist have often equated those who oppose the Laws to anarchic/traitor groups such as Al-Qaeeda and Taliban. These columnists argue, that both parties do not respect the rule of law and don't respect the constitution of the country. Similarly, they blame the State's inactivity for Qadri's act. The State, these columnists argue should have implemented the Laws as they are in the constitution. These columnists are agitated that in the many years since the inclusion of the Laws in the constitution, not one of the accused has been given capital punishment. Hence, the columnists argue that if the State does not do its job, the inactivity would lead to people like Qadri taking the law in their own hand. In timeline C, the columnists of *Daily Jang* put the brunt of the responsibility on the State and ask why Qadri was executed so swiftly? The columnists believe that it did so because it was either under pressure from the international community or simply wanted to appease it.

The presidential pardon is another indication of this representation of hierarchy. The day Salman Taseer met Aasia Bibi, he had her sign an appeal for a presidential pardon against the death penalty awarded to her. After the Supreme court upheld Qadri's death penalty, he too requested a presidential pardon which was rejected. During the narratives, we have many accounts of human rights activists campaigning for a Presidential pardon for Aasia Bibi.

This representation of the State as a truly separate objective entity is problematic. The imagery of an all-powerful, individualized objective entity, which is morally and ethically higher up than the rest is clearly a natural presumption. This presumption builds the

foundations for the narratives of the columnists. However, no modern democratic state works that way. In reality, the state is a diffused entity that is dynamic and flexible in its response to circumstances (Jessop 2016). People who form the state infrastructure interpret and guide the response of state machinery. The columnists seem not to recognize that and see the state in an all powerful hierarchical status. This establishes the hierarchical imagery necessary to use objects of epistemic work in the narrative.

Chapter 7.1.3: Imagery of Progress. The imagery of progress is mostly implicit in the columns collected for the data. In a way, the Dawn columnists tend to assume that progressiveness is pre-requisite to being civilized. This is most obvious in the narratives under "International Lens." For instance, on the imposition of the Blasphemy Laws and the case rulings on such cases, a Dawn columnist says that "We send out simultaneous signals of modernity and medievalism" (E27122010_1a). Similarly, another columnist worries about the "not a very good' impression to the outside world the country gave due to these Laws." In timeline B, the comparisons become stronger as the country is shown to have fallen short from fulfilling the international expectations attached to it. Yet again, the international trends are seen to be the natural way forward as is seen with comparisons to cases in the US and elsewhere. The most obvious representation of the imagery of progress is a particular quote by a columnist in Dawn where he claims that the 'road forward is an inclusive and a progressive Pakistan' (E03032016_1c). Clearly, the columnist here believes that societies and countries need to evolve; to move forward. This move forward is to be more progressive and hence forms the imagery of progress in its most obvious form.

Like the Dawn columns, there were no explicit imageries of progress in the *Daily Jang* columns. However, one example could be seen using the same imagery of progress. The columnists, while criticising the spread of emotionalism within the society, attributed it to illiteracy. In other words a more progressive, literate and educated Pakistan would be more rational. This, as stated, was a rare example in *Daily Jang* as usually, the imagery of progress was more obvious in the narratives in Dawn. Of course, this leaning has to do with the social class of the Dawn readers and columnists. As stated in chapter 5, Dawn does mostly refer to the very elite of the society. Hence, the more elite, well-educated and economically and socially well-off segment of the society is found to believe more on the evolution of the country towards modernism and progressiveness as compare to the rest of the country.

Chapter 7.2: Epistemic Governance: Objects of Epistemic Work

When people try to convince others, they assume that people hold certain imageries and assumptions of the world. This allows them to contextualize the narratives. The assumptions are based on objects of epistemic work. The objects of epistemic work can be divided into 3 categories: Ontology, Actor identifications and Norms & Values.

Chapter 7.2.1: Ontology. The categories of Religion/Religious authorities, Historical accounts, Law, and International Lens can be seen as the umbrella ontological categories within the data. As explained earlier, the categories were based on the trends observed within the data. The arguments used in the narratives were seen to fit into these categories. However, the actual composition varied.

Ontology as an epistemic work acts as authority to knowledge that can then cement imageries. Anyone who undertakes epistemic work needs to find authorities of knowledge, statistics or institutions that can complement arguments. For the discourse surrounding the Blasphemy Laws, the columnists perceive that their audience takes some forms of authorities to base their opinions and biases. Hence, they too employ the same objects of epistemic work to make their arguments. Yet again, it needs to be remembered that these authorities, much like the parent categories, are observed and derived from the data itself. The trends stated below are observable within the narratives of the columnists from Dawn and *Daily Jang* respectively.

Ontology	
Religion/Religious authorities	
Dawn	***Daily Jang***
• *Ulemas* as opinion makers • Religious Political parties' role in passing the Blasphemy Laws • Religious scriptures	• *Ulemas* as protectors of religion and traditions • Religious scriptures • Historical accounts of religiosity of leaders of the Pakistan Independence movement (Iqbal and Jinnah) • Accounts of Islamic History • Historical accounts of previous blasphemy cases with miracles attached to the murderers (Ilm-ud-din, Amir Cheema) • Majority proportion of supporters of the

	Laws in the population
Historical accounts	
• Jinnah's secular vision and his 11th August 1946 speech • Historical accounts of previous blasphemy cases in Pakistan courts • Historical accounts of previous blasphemy accusations • Historical account of the formation and (hurried) implementation of the Blasphemy Laws • Historical accounts of religious history to justify minority rights	• Historical accounts of Islamic Rule of the subcontinent • Historical accounts of the times of Caliphs • Accounts of the case of Ilm-ud-din and the reaction of Iqbal and Jinnah • Jinnah's version of a secular Pakistan • Taseer's father's religious affiliations • Historical accounts of previous blasphemy cases • Historical support for the Laws from Liberal political readers
Law and Legal	
• Law Minister • Social apprehension around the trials of blasphemy accused • Role of State as a protector of religious minorities • Absence of independent judiciary • Vagueness of Laws • Role of State in upholding rule of law	• Independent Judiciary • Constitution • Role of State in upholding law and order • Thoroughness of the Laws and judicial process aimed towards fairness in trial • Failure of the State to respect local laws and instead manufacture legal decisions based on international pressure
International Lens	
• International terrorists • Human Rights activists • Human Rights conventions and commitments • Cases of integration and respect for diversity in Europe and America	• West attacking local traditions • West attacking Islam • West, Scandinavian countries, Europe protecting blasphemers • Rationalism as Western propaganda

Observations on ontology. There are many similarities between the ontological representations in the two newspapers. This is incredibly insightful for the columnists belonging to either newspaper share the understanding of authorities recognized by their

respective audiences. This similarity is slightly puzzling, for the target audience of both newspapers are polar-opposites in terms of economic conditions, social stature, religious tendencies, level of education and degree of culturalism and traditionalism. And yet, both largely share the same understanding of authorities. Hence, in a way, the society might not be as fractured as thought to be. The disparities emerge mostly out of ideological differences. For example, while using authorities under the "Religion/Religious Authorities," the *Daily Jang* columnists focus more on spirituality in history in the form of religious miracles and interpretation of religious histories than the Dawn columnists.

Similarly, under "Historical accounts," the Dawn columnists offer Jinnah's 11th August 1946 speech as proof of his aspirations of a secular state. On the other hand, the *Daily Jang* columnists paint Jinnah as a deeply religious person. They also give accounts of historical figures like *Salaudin Ayubi*, combining history with religious identity as shown by Qadir (2014). Each engage in narratives that appeal to the opposite ideology. For instance, the Dawn columnists insist that religious scholars did not agree to the final form of the Blasphemy Laws. On the contrary, *Daily Jang* columnists detail how the proceedings were spearheaded and approved by liberal politicians. Throughout the narrative, all columnists appeal for the upholding of the legal and constitutional system of Pakistan. For the Dawn columnists, the need to ensure the rights of minorities and eventually, in timeline C, ensuring the writ of the State is more important. For the *Daily Jang* columnists, the opposition to the Blasphemy Laws is criticized for they were included into the constitution through legal processes. The most obvious disparity comes in the narratives on 'International Lens'. Here, the Dawn columnists are more concerned about Pakistan's impression to the world, its commitment to international conventions, its track record of human rights etc. For the *Daily Jang* columnists, the international community seems to be invading force attacking religious, cultural, nationalist and social ideologies of the country. However, even with all the similarities and differences, the engaging of authorities stays consistent. As was observed with imageries, the reliance on ontology surpasses all divisions within the society, and confirms it as an important component of epistemic work as stated by Alasuutari & Qadir (2014).

Chapter 7.2.2: Actor Identifications. The second object of epistemic work is pleading to the actors' identifications. As an object of epistemic work, the identifications contribute by providing a lens to understanding a situation. People's understanding of themselves impacts the way they approach a situation. Their reactions are subject to their

identification with their understanding of what their role is in the social world and how it falls in line with the other roles and environments of the world. In the columns of Dawn and *Daily Jang*, the columnists are seen to engage certain identification of their readership. Yet again, the core categories recognized initially were limited to: Muslim, Pakistani, civilized or a combination of these. However, an in-depth analysis of the data revealed more concrete and specific identifications. These identifications exhibit the expectations of the columnists; that is: how they believe their audience identifies. These assumptions help shape the arguments so that the message resonates with the assumed identifications.

Actor's and Identifications	
D**awn**	***Daily Jang***
• Gullible Muslims • Law Abiding citizen • Rational • Civilized • Modern • Courageous Pakistani prone to religious intimidation • Pakistani national a subject to the State's decisions • Pakistani national who admires Jinnah • Majority • Minority • Just • International individual • Muslim-ness	• Law Abiding citizen • Muslim-ness • International individual • Pakistani national a subject to the State's decisions • Protector of Islam • Protector of Traditions • Pakistani prone to propaganda from Liberal Fascists, Secular, West • Pakistani national who admires Jinnah • Pakistani national who admires Iqbal • Majority • Minority • Just • Rational • Gullible Muslims • Moral • Civilized

Readership across both newspapers are thought by their columnists to identify to different traits. They clearly associate traits to their readership and shape their narratives accordingly. Yet again, there are many similarities between the two newspapers. For example, each newspaper audience is expected to be a law-abiding citizen or one who encourages democratic principles. However, the expectations -the norms and values- out of

these identities vary and will be dealt with later. Similarly, nationalism much like religiousness is integral and a very important type of actor identifications. The disparities amongst the narratives come about due to the different imageries the actors are thought to imagine. For example, for columnists in Dawn believe that their audience must compete against a 'violent religious right' whereas, the *Daily Jang* columnists fear the propaganda by 'liberal fascists'. Yet again, the most insightful realization of these clusters of actor identifications is this: seeking identification is a normal method of discourse for columnists irrespective of their audience or personal ideologies. The columnists from Dawn and *Daily Jang* jointly assume this and form narratives that resonate with these identifications.

Chapter 7.2.3: Norms and Values. Norms and Values are the third component of "objects of epistemic work." These are, yet again, assumed associations. The target audience is assumed to hold principles and values that shape their reactions to situations. There exists a general ideal of what the audience embraces as a norm; the normal way to proceed forward, to act or to think. This falls in line with their actor identifications and in a way, makes a route plan of exactly how a message would be deciphered and reacted upon by a certain combination. Columnists much like everyone else, also understand this relationship and write narratives that can fall in line with these norms and values. The data exhibits a number of norms and values that are listed below. Unlike ontology or actor identification, there were no presumed categories for this object of epistemic work. This is because the norms and values are most obvious in the initial narratives, arguments and presumed reactions of the audience dictated by columnists. Hence, the collection of norms and values could only be made after thoroughly going through all the data.

Norms and Values	
Dawn	***Daily Jang***
• Values proper knowledge • Values Islamic teachings • Values the sovereignty of the state • Values Justice, Judiciary and Judicial Processes • Values Freedom • Values Independence • Values Honour	• Values Islamic teachings • Values Justice, Judiciary and Judicial Processes • Values Independence • Values culture • Values Traditions • Values sovereignty of self-identity • Values historical lineage

• Values Dignity • Values International commitments and regulations • Values progressiveness • Values patriotism • Values historical lineage • Values democratic principles	• Values democratic principles • Values Rationality • Values morality • Values Freedom • Values Honour • Values Dignity • Values patriotism

Both newspapers find norms and values that they assume their readerships hold. Most of these are implied and hence encompass a natural reaction to the information included in the narratives. There are obvious similarities between the two newspapers. The only stark difference found is yet again based on the imagery of a competing propogandist international community due to which the columnists in *Daily Jang* emphasize that the audience values self-identity. Moreover, the Dawn columnists seem to believe in the norm of progress whereas it is largely missing in the *Daily Jang* narratives. However, beyond that, the clusters are similar even if the interpretations are different. For example, each newspaper values "rationality" however, the understanding of what it implies differs. Similarly, the understanding of legal system and the role of the state differs. As with all the other objects of epistemic governance and imageries, there exists no distinction in the use of 'Norms and Values' between the newspapers. The polar audiences yet again exhibit similar expectations and further cement the fact that epistemic governance is a natural way to pursue narratives (Alasuutari & Qadir 2014).

Chapter 7.3: World cultures in the discourse on the Blasphemy Laws

The Blasphemy Laws of Pakistan exist not because of the political realities of the country but because of how they harmonize into the social constructs of Pakistanis. Religion too acts as a form of world culture (Thomas 2007) for it contextualizes our situations and helps us develop our reactions to them. Explained by Robertson (1970) as "a cultural schema that depicts a super-empirical realty which empirical reality drives significance and meaning from," religion too acts as a modus operandi to living for many civilizations. Hence, religious traditions tend to affect the environment available for actors to exist. For example, when religious parties take the capital hostage after the execution of Qadri, they shape the social reality of the country. Just as they do when they garland the murderer or idolize him. Of

course, the impacts of these actions are not limited to Pakistan alone. Their attitudes set precedents for similar occurrences across the world. In all these ways, the religious right shape the emerging world society (Thomas 2002). This was also observed by Qadir (2016) in his analysis of how Ahmadi persecution spread from South Asia to South Africa.

However, what is important to note here is that the individual himself is a construct of the society (Meyer and Jepperson, 2000). Hence the movements trying to impose fundamentalism and those restricting it, solely act out of the world society context. In the same manner, to better understand the role of religion in the environment of global rationalism, the world society, especially the civil society must be seen as a dynamic moral project. Society takes the form that it does after an engagement between the opposite ends of the spectrum. Each side attempts to project its point of view at large seeking to impact the state infrastructure and using it as a pulpit to announce its interpretation of the situation. This is especially obvious in the case of religion where the announcements define morality of not just the "self," but of the state as well. Hence, the columnist take upon themselves to define what is right and what is wrong using religious dogmas and citations. More interestingly, they infuse religion with historical accounts and form new narratives that lead to moral lessons. This however is not a one-way street. Just as religion defines morality to the world, the world too changes religion. By coming into conflict with global narrative of religious freedom, the religious right in Pakistan hence has no other solution but to reshape itself to the needs of the new environment. The reshaping does not solely come in the form of a sacrifice but in fact can also be seen as a sharper, more aggressive stance while relying on the blind faith of spiritualism. For example, the columnists while insisting that the Laws are spiritual and hence are more supreme than man-made laws, continue to use the constitution of the country as arguments towards supporting them (described in detail below). Or, on the contrary, the columnists in *Daily Jang* completely disregard the expectations of the world and insist that the Laws are an internal matter. Hence, in these engagements, a person, or the civil society at large can become both religious as well as relatively secular depending on which global narrative, which world cultural script they adhere to.

As observed in the data there is an obvious clash of different world cultures. There is Pakistan, a country that has committed to numerous human rights conventions out of, what seems, sheer fashion (Thomas 2009; Alasuutari, P. et al, 2014). These conventions stand at loggerheads with local traditions and perceptions, such as the Blasphemy Laws, that strongly contradict them. Pressurized by social dynamics of the country, subsequent governments

continue to uphold the Laws and allow state infrastructure to target accused blasphemers. These Laws are clear proof of how the country has decoupled from its commitments, leaving the conventions merely customary (Meyer et al., 1997). The Laws themselves are mere tools used by agents to engage a social discourse in line with perceived imageries of the world. By basing their arguments on these imageries, these agents manage to resonate with the populace and stay relevant, politically or otherwise.

Furthermore, the protectors of the Laws see the world as constantly dereligionizing by giving into forces of secularism. They gain their most support by emphasizing the imagery that the west/ world/ seculars seek to replace religion with narratives of rationalism. They manage to massage this insecurity making themselves essential protectors of religion and local traditions. However, this is simply not true. As stated above, Thomas (2007) concludes that "the world is as religious today as it is secular." This realization breaks down their imagery of a constantly fainting religious existence, in effect making their efforts unnecessary.

As seen in the data, the narratives seem to imply that Pakistan is a unique case. The columnists interloop traditions with historical accounts, supernatural miracles, legal protocols in order to exhibit how the Blasphemy Laws, and the conflict surrounding them, are truly Pakistani in nature. Similarly, these agents imply that the social discourse is a result of an infusion of religious identity and nationalism; a combination that is prided to be unique. And yet, the analysis of the data proves otherwise. By breaking down narratives in obvious imageries and objects of epistemic work, the thesis proves that the social discourse around the Laws follows the very generic processes of epistemic governance (Alasuutari & Qadir 2014). The categories observed, the imageries and objects of epistemic work identified, are not unique in nature. In fact, the same categories can be observed everywhere where Laws such as the Blasphemy Laws would come into conflict with a human rights discourse. This implicit embracing of epistemic governance is a representation of world culture which has deeply penetrated the cultural schema of the country.

However, the process of epistemic governance is not the only representation of world culture trends observed in the data. When appealing to the readers, columnist who evidently disregard 'worldly' laws still use the constitution of Pakistan to support their arguments. For example, numerous columnists insisted that the Blasphemy Laws were implemented after a thorough legal process and hence those who oppose them are simply against the constitution of the country which, in return, labels them as traitors. Both the constitution and nationality

are world culture traits. They only make sense as long as one believes in the authority and legality of the other 194 constitutions in the world. Hence, even though these columnists seek to interpret their actions in local contexts in order to undermine influence from the outside world, they are simultaneously acknowledging the world cultures around the debate.

Similarly, the same columnists interpret their discourse through the 'international lens' while simultaneously trying to detach themselves from it. An abundant proportion of the columnists from Dawn do the exact opposite by, instead, seeping international commitments, expectations and supra-territorial relations into the debate. There is an obvious representation of international discourse in the narratives of the Dawn columnists as well. The fact that narratives from both the newspapers dedicate a significant amount of energy to speak through the 'international lens' is proof of the interdependent world Robertson (2008, p.49) spoke about. Yet again, a dialogue within the context of an international setting is an example of world culture.

The columnists from Dawn are seen to imply that the country needs to become more progressive. They do so by comparing its track record against internationally recognized benchmarks. This comparison is another example of the embracing of a world culture. Pakistan too is walking the same path that countries all over the world have either walked already or hope to walk soon: the walk towards progressiveness. All societies, worldwide exhibit rhetoric discourse to evolve the country into the global expectation of progressiveness. Pakistan too is seen to pursue this, show casing another case of embracing of world culture.

Chapter 7.4: Gender Analysis

Of the 151 citations used in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, 13 citations were from female columnists. Out of the 13, five were in *Daily Jang* and the rest were in Dawn. The five citations in *Daily Jang* all belonged to one columnist who is the wife of the head of the biggest religious party in Pakistan, the *Jamaat-e-Islami*. As for the 8 citations of Dawn, they were from columns by 3 female authors with two of them cited thrice and one cited twice. Indeed, the count is depressing after all 48.6% of Pakistan's population is female[53]. The reasons for this low count could be many. There is the obvious literacy difference but more importantly, it does display that not many women are either interested or feel themselves capable of dealing with narratives on the Laws. After all, many women writers are writing in the media on other different topics. The angst pertaining to this 'disassociation' is reflected in

[53] WorldBank: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL.FE.ZS

one of the columnist's complaint on Aasia Bibi's accusation where she insisted that the over-worked women, instead of getting together, fought bitterly and accused one of their own of blasphemy (E24122010_1a). Similarly, the literate women writers and columnists of Pakistan can indeed redirect their attention towards writing on the Laws especially for Aasia Bibi as she is the first woman in the history of Pakistan to be awarded a death penalty for blasphemy.

Chapter 7.5: Further findings: The mythical origins of the nation

The data, besides being insightful about epistemic governance, also reveals some other findings. One very interesting such finding is the mythical interpretations of the leading historical figures of the country, Jinnah and Iqbal. A significant amount of scholarship has been dedicated within Pakistan to paint these two historical celebrities in shades of what is required for the nation. The country has been questioning its existence from the very start. Why was Pakistan founded? There are two major answers to this question. One is that the country was founded for the Muslim population so that they could live their lives independently without facing the problems that come with being a permanent minority. The second answer to the same question is this: the country was founded for the Muslim population so that they could live their lives independently according to the tenants of Islam. Proponents of each answer have been engaging with each other since the very beginning of Pakistani years. Each side has it's stack of ontologies which they use to engage and convince future generations. These arguments have since re-imaged what has been known about Jinnah and Iqbal. Both seem to want a state that is in line with both the camps. Each camp collects quotations, speeches, poetry, historical accounts to prove that Jinnah and Iqbal wanted their version of Pakistan. There are of course visuals to support this divide. A simple web image search of Jinnah would reveal, amongst others, pictures where the man is either dressed in a sharp suit, smoking a cigarette, holding his dogs; or him dressed in a traditional *sherwani*, donning a fur *qaraqul* (a skull cap named after him), praying in a congregation. To observe this disparity for Jinnah, one needs not to go beyond comparing narratives of him in any government sponsored historical book and Jalal's (1994) description.

This can also be observed in the obfuscation surrounding the two in the data collected for this thesis. Jinnah, for example, is constantly referred by the Dawn columnists as having wanted a secular state. They refer to his 11th August 1946 speech and insist that, with the present version of Pakistan, they have betrayed their founder. They rely on a liberal, anti-Islamic law in Pakistan by drawing on Jinnah. On the contrary, there are accounts in *Daily Jang* columns which insist that Jinnah was a deeply religious person who was always *ba-*

waduh (in ablution) and offered 'tahajjud' prayers. Each of these columnists firmly believe in their version of Jinnah and disregard the opposite. Jinnah being the ultimate expression of nationalism builds up on their definition of patriotism. Similarly, just as Dawn columnists insist that they have betrayed the founder's vision due to the imposition of laws such as the Blasphemy Laws, the *Daily Jang* columnists insist that Jinnah defended Ilm-ud-din's case and hence supported the Laws. Yet again, the version of Jinnah one believes in meticulously defines and ties the version of country one wants.

The same is applicable for Iqbal, who is extensively used by the *Daily Jang* columnists and shown to be a very religious person. There are many accounts of Iqbal being extremely sensitive about blasphemy in the columns in *Daily Jang*. Similarly, there are accounts of him being impressed by Ilm-ud-din's action. Iqbal being the philosophical father of the country is as important in the country's history as is Jinnah. It is no understatement if the two are taken as the two main pillars of Pakistan's ideology. Hence, by referring to Iqbal and his devotion to the anti-blasphemy movement, the *Daily Jang* columnists manage to strongly emphasize that the present Laws are in line with the aspirations of Iqbal. And yet, while no Dawn columnist uses a contrary version of Iqbal to support their arguments, a considerable amount of scholarly work is available that offers another version of Iqbal. For example, Fateh (2008, p.12) offers a version of Iqbal where he is in favor of Ataturk's abolition of the caliphate and appreciative of his secular version of Islam and ruling.

The differentiated use of these two historical personalities is just a scratch on the surface of a country that's filled with 'banal nationalism' (Billing 1995). There is a mythical element attached to them just as it is to the very origins of the founding of Pakistan. The historical narratives are shrouded with mystery and heroism. Most of these accounts fall short of giving the true picture. The contradictions are obvious and yet, people continue believing in their versions of realities. In that sense, the nation itself is an imagined community that firmly believes in its uniqueness, sovereignty and individual identity. People of Pakistan firmly believe in their unique traits and history as a community. They appeal to figures, historical or otherwise and paint them in narratives of heroism and mystery so that they appeal to their versions of beliefs. The cultural infusion attached to somewhat ambiguous historical accounts (after all history has many versions, each truer and false than the other) of Jinnah and Iqbal cultivates a deeper sense of this 'banal nationalism' similar to Alasuutari (2013) observations. This mythology is the essence of such an identity and figuring out where

and when these heroic versions of the founding and philosophical fathers of the country developed has potential for interesting future research.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

The study sought to recognize the different discourses used by Pakistani society to either rationalize or condemn the Blasphemy Laws. This was successfully done using the epistemic governance approach via which the narratives in the columns of the leading newspapers of the country were broken down into imageries and objects of epistemic work. It was surprising to note that even though the two newspapers catered to somewhat polar-opposite segments of the society, they still mostly followed the same route to epistemically govern their readership. Similar forms of imageries and authorities were employed with each side latching their own content to them. Everyone, hence, was talking in the same way with some interesting variations which were pointed out in the analysis. The findings of the thesis offer much insight into the way column writers phrase their narratives to convince the readership of their opinions. The imageries identified show what the writers believe is the reality recognized by their readers. The categories of authorities discovered in the narratives offer insight on the expected categorization on conversations on laws similar to the Blasphemy Laws of Pakistan. In that sense, it would not be an exaggeration to claim that any discourse around such laws elsewhere would also use the support of these categories of authorities. This realization will have implications on many levels. For Pakistan, the study identifies the imageries of that segment of the society that reads these two newspapers. As they are the most widely read newspapers in each language, the patterns can be expected to repeat in the column pieces of other newspapers as well (Gobo 2008). In that sense, the reader of this study can get a representation of imageries of the segment of Pakistan's society that can read. The categories of authorities and objects of epistemic work identified can help guide policy makers to shape their narratives to bring the conversation on Blasphemy Laws forward. The same application can be done on any religious laws across the world. The study gives an understanding of how the narratives need to be shaped and particular authorities need to be employed in order to best contextualize debates in the perceived realities of their audience. Finally, the study builds up on the work done by Alasuutari and Qadir (2014) and confirms the role and importance of epistemic governance in forming narratives.

The study also recognized the numerous world forces at play that blend into each other to form what Pakistan firmly believes as it's unique social identity. This confirms the claim of

numerous world cultural scholars of the abundance and similarity of trends across geographies. Finally, the heroism painted on historical figures offered insight onto how easily one could believe in their version of reality and how manufactured history could cement such details. All in all, the study managed to sought out what it aspired to do. The reader of this study will be well-versed on the history and evolution of the Blasphemy Laws of Pakistan and will also manage to see how the Pakistani society forms the social constructs around the debate on them. The reader would also be able to better form their own narratives in order to engage in epistemic governance with anyone who believes in similar laws anywhere in the world. The study hence makes policy makers more apt to discuss religiously motivated controversial laws. It is hoped that someone, somewhere makes good use of the potential of these findings and manages to change a narrative that has, as yet, proven unchangeable.

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Appendix

	CODE	AUTHOR	NEWSPAPER	DATE	TITLE	GENDER
1.	E20112010_1a	Irfan husain	Dawn	20112010	Venting my spleen	M
2.	E25122010_1a	I.A. Rehman	Dawn	25122010	The blasphemy law	M
3.	E30122010_1a	Kamran Shafi	Dawn	30122010	Our lovely image	M
4.	E31122010_1a	Irfan husain	Dawn	31122010	Analyzing Pakistan's DNA	M
5.	E04012011_1a	Rafia Zakaria	Dawn	04012011	The path of silence	F
6.	U29112010_2a	Dr. Samia Raheel Qazi	Jang	29112010	*Qanon Toheen-e-Rasalat kya hai aur kyu zaroori hai? II*	F
7.	U28112010_2a	Dr. Samia Raheel Qazi	Jang	28112010	*Qanon Toheen-e-Rasalat kya hai aur kyu zaroori hai?*	F
8.	U30112010_2a	Dr. Samia Raheel Qazi	Jang	30112010	*Qanon Toheen-e-Rasalat kya hai aur kyu zaroori hai? III*	F
9.	U29112010_1a	Hamid Mir	Jang	29112010	*Inshallah Fatah humari hogi*	M
10.	E11012011_1b	Mahir Ali	Dawn	11012011	Hate crimes and their aftermath	M
11.	E13012011_1b	Cyril Almeida	Dawn	13012011	Tactical retreat or total defeat?	M
12.	E28012011_1b	Cyril Almeida	Dawn	28012011	Culture warriors	M
13.	E07012011_2b	Kuldip Nayar	Dawn	07012011	Time to begin a dialogue	M
14.	E11012011_1b	Mahir Ali	Dawn	11012011	Hate crimes and their aftermath	M
15.	E13012011_1b	Cyril Almeida	Dawn	13012011	Tactical retreat or total defeat?	M
16.	E15012011_2b	Irfan husain	Dawn	15012011	Might is right, according to the right	M
17.	E07012011_1b	Irfan husain	Dawn	07012011	Blaming the victim	M
18.	E05012011_1b	Jawed Naqvi	Dawn	05012011	Who are we dying to please?	M
19.	E28012011_1b	Cyril Almeida	Dawn	28012011	Culture warriors	M
20.	E10012011_1b	Kamran Shafi	Dawn	10012011	A cry in the wilderness	M
21.	E31012011_1b	Kamran Shafi	Dawn	31012011	Cutting off the nose…	M
22.	E09022011_1b	I.A. Rehman	Dawn	09022011	No security in fear	M
23.	E07012011_1b	Irfan husain	Dawn	07012011	Blaming the victim	M
24.	E06012011_1b	Cyril Almeida	Dawn	06012011	Who will fight back?	M

25.	E07012011_1b	Irfan husain	Dawn	07012011	Blaming the victim	M
26.	E03032011_1b	XXXXXXX	Dawn	03032011	Minorities in Islam	-
27.	E15012011_2b	Irfan husain	Dawn	15012011	Might is right, according to the right	M
28.	E07012011_1b	Irfan husain	Dawn	07012011	Blaming the victim	M
29.	E14032011_1b	Maajid Nawaz	Dawn	14032011	A dangerous narrative	M
30.	E06012011_1b	Cyril Almeida	Dawn	06012011	Who will fight back?	M
31.	E10012011_1b	Kamran Shafi	Dawn	10012011	A cry in the wilderness	M
32.	E03032011_1b	XXXXXXX	Dawn	03032011	Minorities in Islam	-
33.	E03032011_1b	XXXXXXX	Dawn	03032011	Minorities in Islam	-
34.	E08012011_1b	Nadeem F. Paracha	Dawn	08012011	Smokers' Corner: What casualties these are	M
35.	E03032011_1b	XXXXXXX	Dawn	03032011	Minorities in Islam	-
36.	U09012011_1b	Irfan Siddiqui	Jang	09012011	*Ye mamlay hain nazuk* II	M
37.	U16012011_3b	Mohammad Saleem Siddiqui	Jang	16012011	*Ba-Muhammad Hoshiaar*	M
38.	U07012011_4b	Irfan Siddiqui	Jang	07012011	*Ye mamlay hain nazuk*	M
39.	U09012011_1b	Irfan Siddiqui	Jang	09012011	*Ye mamlay hain nazuk* II	M
40.	U12012011_4b	Haroon Al-Rasheed	Jang	12012011	*Joshay ki haqeeqat ko na samjhe wo nazar kya?*	M
41.	U10012011_2b	Ansar Abassi	Jang	10012011	*Masla Toheen Rasalat..kiss se masfi chaye*	M
42.	U16012011_3b	Mohammad Saleem Siddiqui	Jang	16012011	*Ba-Muhammad Hoshiaar*	M
43.	U10012011_2b	Ansar Abassi	Jang	10012011	*Masla Toheen Rasalat..kiss se masfi chaye*	M
44.	U11012011_1b	Irshad Ahmed Arif Iqbal	Jang	11012011	*Terey dais ka kya haal Sunao*	M
45.	U21012011_1b	Saeed Siddiqui	Jang	21012011	*Sateeza kar raha hai izl se ta amrooz*	M
46.	U09012011_2b	Saeed Siddiqui	Jang	09012011	*Quied-e-Azam per Bohtaan laganay walay*	M
47.	U08012011_1b	Haroon Al-Rasheed	Jang	08012011	*Ain- Jinab e Wala Aai*	M
48.	U08012011_2b	Shafqat Mehmood	Jang	08012011	*Kya hum aik Munksam Qoum*	M

					hain??	
49.	U08012011_4b	Arshad Ahmed Arif	Jang	08012011	*Bey Khatr kodd para Aatish Namrood Main Ishq*	M
50.	U06012011_2b	Haroon Al-Rasheed	Jang	06012011	*Aur Jo ghor nahy kartay*	M
51.	U08012011_1b	Haroon Al-Rasheed	Jang	08012011	*Ain- Jinab e Wala Aai*	M
52.	U10012011_2b	Ansar Abassi	Jang	10012011	*Masla Toheen Rasalat..kiss se masfi chaye*	M
53.	U07012011_4b	Irfan Siddiqui	Jang	07012011	*Ye mamlay nazuk hain*	M
54.	U16012011_3b	Mohammad Saleem Siddiqui	Jang	16012011	*Ba-Muhammad Hoshiaar*	M
55.	U11012011_1b	Irshad Ahmed Arif Iqbal	Jang	11012011	*Terey dais ka kya haal Sunao*	M
56.	U12012011_3b	Ishtiaq Baig	Jang	12012011	*Qanoon Toheen-e-Rasalat aur Ghazi Ilmudin Shaheed*	M
57.	U19012011_1b	Ishtiaq Baig	Jang	19012011	*… Qanoon Toheen-e-Rasalat aur Ghazi Ilmudin Shaheed...Aaj ki Duniya*	M
58.	U11012011_1b	Irshad Ahmed Arif Iqbal	Jang	11012011	*Terey dais ka kya haal Sunao*	M
59.	U11012011_1b	Irshad Ahmed Arif Iqbal	Jang	11012011	*Terey dais ka kya haal Sunao*	M
60.	U16012011_3b	Mohammad Saleem Siddiqui	Jang	16012011	*Ba-Muhammad Hoshiaar*	M
61.	U06012011_2b	Haroon Al-Rasheed	Jang	06012011	*Aur Jo ghor nahy kartay*	M
62.	U08012011_2b	Shafqat Mehmood	Jang	08012011	*Kya hum aik munksam Qoum hain??*	M
63.	U08012011_2b	Shafqat Mehmood	Jang	08012011	*Kya hum aik munksam Qoum hain??*	M
64.	U12012011_1b	Nazeer Naji	Jang	12012011	*Mutafaqa Islami Aain*	M
65.	U16012011_2b	Raheem ullah Yusuf Zy	Jang	16012011	*Salman Taseer Ka Katl*	M
66.	U07022011_1b	Hamid Mir	Jang	07022011	*Aafia Siddiqui aur Liberal fascism*	M
67.	E01032016_1c	Jawed Naqvi	Dawn	01032016	Slaying Raktabeej was never easy	M
68.	E02032016_1c	Rafia Zakaria	Dawn	02032016	The end of Qadri	F
69.	E16032016_1c	Babbar Sattar	Dawn	16032016	In defense of Qadri verdict	M
70.	E05032016_1c	Abbas Nasir	Dawn	05032016	The right course forward	M
71.	E09032016_1c	Zahid Hussain	Dawn	09032016	The state and justice	M

72.	E04032016_1c	Asha'Ar Rehman	Dawn	04032016	The usual scenes	M
73.	E05032016_1c	Abbas Nasir	Dawn	05032016	The right course forward	M
74.	E13032016_1c	Muhammad Amir Rana	Dawn	13032016	In search of relevance	M
75.	U03032016_2c	XXXXXXX	Jang	03032016	*Fikri Intishaar*	-
76.	U05032016_1c	XXXXXXX	Jang	05032016	*Rajaiat aur Inteha Pasandi ke dirmiyan Kashmakash*	-
77.	U04032016_1c	XXXXXXX	Jang	04032016	*Shan-e-Mustafa*	-
78.	U11032016_1c	XXXXXXX	Jang	11032016	*Murda Zameeron key Pathay huye kafn*	-
79.	U04032016_1c	XXXXXXX	Jang	04032016	*Shan-e-Mustafa*	-
80.	E31122010_1a	Irfan husain	Dawn	31122010	Analysing Pakistan's DNA	M
81.	E20112010_1a	Irfan husain	Dawn	20112010	Venting my spleen	M
82.	E25122010_1a	I.A. Rehman	Dawn	25122010	The blasphemy law	M
83.	U28112010_2a	Doctor Samia Raheel Qazi	Jang	28112010	*Kannon Toheen-e-rasalat kya hai aur kyu zaroori hai?*	F
84.	U07122010_1a	Sarwar Ahmed Qadri	Jang	07122010	*Toheen-e-Rasalat..andaz-e-biyan*	M
85.	U28112010_1a	Nazeer Naji	Jang	28112010	*Khuda Ka Khof Karo*	M
86.	U28112010_1a	Nazeer Naji	Jang	28112010	*Khuda Ka Khof Karo*	M
87.	E22012011_1b	Ardeshir Cowasjee	Dawn	22012011	Blind and stupid and savage	M
88.	E16012011_1b	Ardeshir Cowasjee	Dawn	16012011	Jinnah's Pakistan?	M
89.	E16012011_1b	Ardeshir Cowasjee	Dawn	16012011	Jinnah's Pakistan?	M
90.	E07012011_2b	Kuldip Nayar	Dawn	07012011	Time to begin a dialogue	M
91.	E30032015_1b	Huma Yusuf	Dawn	30032015	More than words	F
92.	E30032015_1b	Huma Yusuf	Dawn	30032015	More than words	F
93.	U06012011_2b	Haroon Al-Rasheed	Jang	06012011	*Aur jo ghor nahy karte*	M
94.	U11012011_1b	Irshad Ahmed Arif Iqbal	Jang	11012011	*Terey dais ka kya haal Sunao*	M
95.	U12012011_3b	Ishtiaq Baig	Jang	12012011	*Qanoon Toheen-e-Rasalat aur Ghazi Ilmudin Shaheed*	M
96.	U09012011_2b	Saeed Siddiqui	Jang	09012011	*Quied-e-Azam per Bohtaan laganay walay*	M
97.	U11012011_1b	Irshad Ahmed Arif Iqbal	Jang	11012011	*Terey dais ka kya haal Sunao*	M

98.	U24122015_1b	XXXXXXX	Jang	24122015	*Nabi Rehmat Salala ho Alai Wasalam*	-
99.	U11012011_1b	Irshad Ahmed Arif Iqbal	Jang	11012011	*Terey dais ka kya haal Sunao*	M
100.	U09012011_3b	Masood Ashar	Jang	09012011	*Goyam Mushkil o Garna Goyam Mushkil*	M
101.	E09032016_1c	Zahid Hussain	Dawn	09032016	The state and justice	M
102.	E25122010_1a	I.A. Rehman	Dawn	25122010	The blasphemy law	M
103.	U25112010_2a	Arshad Ahmed Arif	Jang	25112010	*Zalimo..Kalima parhaney ka bhy ehsaan gya*	M
104.	U25112010_1a	Hamid Mir	Jang	25112010	*Aasia bibi aur Qanoon Toheen-e-Rasalat*	M
105.	E09022011_1b	I.A. Rehman	Dawn	09022011	No security in fear	M
106.	E26042015_1b	Reema Omer	Dawn	26042015	Impartial courts	F
107.	E14102015_1b	Zahid Hussain	Dawn	14102015	Confronting the demon	M
108.	E10042015_1b	Aafiyat Nazar	Dawn	10042015	No questions asked	M
109.	U08012011_1b	Haroon Al-Rasheed	Jang	08012011	*Ain- Jinab e Wala Aai*	M
110.	U12012011_2b	Atta-ul-haq Qasmi	Jang	12012011	*Baat chali nikli hai ab daikhain kahan tak pohnchay*	M
111.	U08012011_1b	Haroon Al-Rasheed	Jang	08012011	*Ain- Jinab e Wala Aai*	M
112.	U13012011_2b	Ansar Abassi	Jang	13012011	*Qanoon Namoos-e-Rasalat- Haqaiq aur Propoganda*	M
113.	U09012011_1b	Irfan Siddiqui	Jang	09012011	*Ye mamlay hain nazuk II*	M
114.	U09012011_1b	Irfan Siddiqui	Jang	09012011	*Ye mamlay hain nazuk II*	M
115.	U07012011_4b	Irfan Siddiqui	Jang	07012011	*Ye mamlay hain nazuk*	M
116.	U06012011_2b	Haroon Al-Rasheed	Jang	06012011	*Aur jo ghor nahy kartey*	M
117.	U09012011_5b	Muno Bhai	Jang	09012011	*Insaan ka wahshat ki taraf wapsi ka safr*	M
118.	U09012011_1b	Irfan Siddiqui	Jang	09012011	*Ye mamlay hain nazuk II*	M
119.	U15012011_2b	Masood Asher	Jang	15012011	*Hum kis se kahain_*	M
120.	U06012011_2b	Haroon Al-Rasheed	Jang	06012011	*Aur jo ghor nahy kartey*	M
121.	U14102015_1b	XXXXXXX	Jang	14102015	*Aik Ruka Huwa Faisla*	-

122.	E05032016_1c	Abbas Nasir	Dawn	05032016	The right course forward	M
123.	E03032016_1c	Khurram Husain	Dawn	03032016	Burying the assassin	M
124.	E02032016_1c	Rafia Zakaria	Dawn	02032016	The end of Qadri	F
125.	E13032016_1c	Muhammad Amir Rana	Dawn	13032016	In search of relevance	M
126.	E03032016_1c	Khurram Husain	Dawn	03032016	Burying the assassin	M
127.	U04032016_1c	XXXXXXX	Jang	04032016	*Shan-e-Mustafa*	-
128.	U03032016_1c	XXXXXXX	Jang	03032016	*Mumtaz Qadri ki phansi ki itni jaldi kyu?*	-
129.	E20112010_1u	Irfan husain	Dawn	20112010	Venting my spleen	M
130.	E24122010_1a	Rafia Zakaria	Dawn	24122010	A sip of water	F
131.	E27122010_1a	Irfan husain	Dawn	27122010	Right man for the right job	M
132.	E25122010_1a	I.A. Rehman	Dawn	25122010	The blasphemy law	M
133.	E20112010_1a	Irfan husain	Dawn	20112010	Venting my spleen	M
134.	U29112010_1a	Hamid Mir	Jang	29112010	*Inshallah Fatah humari hogi*	M
135.	U05122010_1a	Syed Munawar Hussain	Jang	05122010	*Musalmanu ke markaz-e-mohabat per humla*	M
136.	U25112010_2a	Arshad Ahmed Arif	Jang	25112010	*Zalimo..Kalima parhaney ka bhy ehsaan gya*	M
137.	U30112010_2a	Dr. Samia Raheel Qazi	Jang	30112010	*Qanon Toheen-e-Rasalat kya hai aur kyu zaroori hai? III*	F
138.	E01042015_1b	Reema Omer	Dawn	01042015	Vague laws	F
139.	E09012011_1b	Huma Yusuf	Dawn	09012011	The global response	F
140.	E04022011_1b	XXXXXXX	Dawn	04022011	Persecution of minorities	M
141.	E26042015_1b	Reema Omer	Dawn	26042015	Impartial courts	F
142.	U20012011_3b	Hamid Mir	Jang	20012011	*Wo jo Pakistan se mayus Nahy*	M
143.	U11012011_1b	Irshad Ahmed Arif Iqbal	Jang	11012011	*Terey dais ka kya haal Sunao*	M
144.	U13012011_1b	Irfan Siddiqui	Jang	13012011	*Papa-e-Azam! Apni Hadu main Rahain*	M
145.	U13012011_2b	Ansar Abassi	Jang	13012011	*Qanoon Namoos-e-Rasalat- Haqaiq aur Propoganda*	M
146.	U06012011_2b	Haroon Al-Rasheed	Jang	06012011	*Aur jo ghor nahy kartey*	M

147.	U07012011_4b	Irfan Siddiqui	Jang	07012011	*Ye mamlay hain nazuk*	M
148.	E02032016_1c	Rafia Zakaria	Dawn	02032016	The end of Qadri	F
149.	U04032016_1c	XXXXXXX	Jang	04032016	*Shan-e-Mustafa*	-
150.	U13032016_1c	XXXXXXX	Jang	13032016	*Kya Hakomat Liberal hai?*	-
151.	U03032016_1c	XXXXXXX	Jang	03032016	*Mumtaz Qadri ki phansi ki itni jaldi kyu?*	-